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Dispatch → Factbook → Military
The Armed Forces
The Armed Force of the Republic of China is the nation's regular military force. It is currently one of the world's more well-equipped and trained forces.
Mission
The armed forces of the Republic of China is the principal facility through which the state defends the nation, by force, from invasions. The armed forces are loyal to the nation and obedient to her command, exercised lawfully through the government. The Constitution expressly prohibits China from waging any war of aggression, expansion, or destruction; these constraints are stringently heeded. Members of the military are not permitted to engage in party political activities or divert their loyalty from the nation to any individual or association. Military power is hold by the state exclusively and completely.
On a more substantive level, the armed forces are a dernier resort in the matter of national defence. The state is legally, politically, and fiscally obliged to seek peaceful means to resolve conflicts before calling the armed forces to intervene. As such, the armed forces are but one component in the implementation of defence policy. On a broader horizon, the state security institutions and diplomatic functions are also means by which the state defends the people against invasion.
Vision
China currently is the second-largest country on Earth by territory and the largest by population. The task of defending such massive population comparatively evenly distributed over such a large area is a task not faced by any other military in the world. As the Constitution clearly defines the nature of the armed forces as defensive, defence policy identifies as the highest objective of the armed forces to attain to these goals:
- Professionalization -- conscription should be a last resort and not activated unless absolutely necessary, as it is destructive to the economy and civilian society. Even during war time, the military should strive to rely on professional soldiers, who are more experienced and reliable (in a technical sense) than conscripts. Continued training of officers is also part of this goal, in order maximize the professional potential and contribution of each officer. As civilian control over the military has been firmly in place and not subject to easy challenge for decades, the practise of commission rotation (rotation of unit commanders systematically) should be terminated; the benefits of better officer/servicemen adhesion should now exceed the relatively remote risk of militant regionalism.
Optimization -- The military should be of an optimal size, neither too large, which represents a fiscal burden to the nation and barrier to healthy employment, nor too small, which may compromise the security of the nation. Pure general infantry should be reduced to a minimum and replaced with more specialized units, who are more "optimized" to guard the garrison at which they are stationed. Mobilization is part of this objective, and most units are assigned transport vehicles, which enable them to become more mobile in their sphere of operation and faster in deployment speed.
Versatility -- The military should be seen as a reliable and rational body that can safeguard not only the collective security of the nation in abstract, but the physical safety of citizens. As such, the military should be accessible as a reactive power to natural disasters or violent disturbances. On a more technical level, the various branches of the military should also actively co-operate with each other, especially at locations of significant value in strategy.
Honour -- The military must be realized as a responsible and law-abiding body that holds itself to standards, legal and ethical, higher than other government bodies. Transparency and accountability are maintained to the highest possible standards feasible. In the past, only the Chief of the Military Staff is accountable to the Legislative Yuan, and only in provision of information (political responsibility was on the Minister alone). The commanders must respect their subordinates and refrain from abuse. Especially when operating in foreign territory and dealing with foreign citizens, the reputation of the armed forces of the Republic of China must be preserved. All officers must closely understand relevant legislation — to the end that an illegal command is rejected without hesitation or concern of reprisal.
The Commander-in-Chief
The President, as head of state, is the Commander-in-Chief (German Oberbefehl) over all armed forces of the Republic of China and the constitutional source of command authority. He has the privilege of reviewing of the forces, which are reviewed twice per annum, on New Year's Day and on Hsin-hai Revolution Memorial Day (Oct. 10th), in memory of the revolution that overthrew the final dynasty and established the Republic. In his absence, the office of the Commander-in-Chief, along with his other duties, defaults to the Vice President for the duration of that incapacity. While the constitution acknowledges the President as the commander-in-chief, primary legislation delegates all actual authority to the Minister of Defence.
The President also has power to declare war and peace, though this is only done with the advice of the Executive Yuan and an affirmative resolution of the Legislative Yuan. The highest category of officers (civilian, above Assistant Secretary; military, above Brigadier General or its equivalent) are appointed by the Ministry of Defence, with the approval of the Executive Yuan, and symbolically approbated by the President. Subordinate officers are appointed the Ministry of Defence or the Defence Staff with the approval of the Ministry of Defence. The President grants orders and decorations in recognition of meritorious actions, though this power, like others, are only exercised with the advice of the Executive Yuan.
Executive Yuan
The Executive Yuan is China's Cabinet and Cabinet Office.
As China's constitution provides a parliamentary system with few deviations, the Executive Yuan is collectively responsible for all government actions to the Legislative Yuan (the national parliament), and this responsibility extends to the armed forces. If the nation suffers a military defeat, the Executive Yuan is still responsible, as part of a failure in the objective of national defence. The statutory remit of the Executive Yuan is stipulated to be the formulation of defence policy and supervision of its implementation, and the Executive Yuan has no position on the chain of command. Nevertheless, as the organizational superior to the Ministry of Defence, the chain of command cannot pass along any command against defence policy.
Ministry of Defence
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is responsible for both military administration and command, and is the responsible ministry for all affairs relating to the armed forces. The minister of the MoD is the Secretary of State for Defence. The Secretary of State is assisted by a Minister of State and a Parliamentary Under-secretary of State. The duties of the junior minister is to assist the minister to ensure that all draft proposals from the staff below conforms to the policy objectives of the minister; as hierarchical subordinates to the minister, they have power to reject drafts they deem objectionable. The Permanent Secretary is the most senior civil servant in the MoD and chief of staff of the minister; his duties are to supervise the various departments in the ministry, to carry out the policies of the minister, and to advise the minister on administrative questions.
Destroyed during air raid in 1991
In terms of its duties relating to administration, it develops defect strategies, oversees and organizes appointments, expenditure, general administration, and technology over the military. Military schools for officers are under the administration of the Ministry of Defence, though compliance to Ministry of Education policy is required, as the consent of the latter is required for the granting of any academic degree. Other military schools, such as those for non-commissioned officers and more specialized personnel, are under the administration of the Defence Staff.
The Ministry maintains total control over human resources over the armed forces, as the ranking, remuneration, promotion, and appointment of military personnel of whatever rank is regarded as military administration. All requests for change of commission or moving units must be approved by the Ministry, as with any change in rank. The power to confer honours also lies with the Ministry, though the physical order (ribbon or sash) is granted by the President. Order of battle, unit organization, formation, dissolution, and junction are handled by the Ministry directly.
Military budget is also controlled by the Ministry, which accepts the budgetary proposals from each independent unit (brigade and above) directly and screens them for any misappropriation. Necessary cuts are made at this stage. These proposals are then amalgamated into one final draft, which is submitted to the Executive Yuan for final approval before submission to the Legislative Yuan. Some items in the budgetary proposals would be noted as "secret" if the precise use of the allocation is not to be made public; the Ministry usually honours these requests, by affixing a note to the Legislative Yuan, which requests the legislature to go into closed session when debating these articles. The Legislative Yuan, however, has ultimate discretion in what items should be public and which should not.
Procurement of military supply and co-operation with civilian contractors is also controlled by the Ministry; again, individual units communicate with the Ministry, or alternately, with the provincial Departments of Military Administration for such access. The Ministry itself controls several dozen production plants directly run by itself, producing everything from uniforms to ordnance; the Ministry is working to "unload" these production facilities to civilian enterprises, as it would encourage commerce, a long standing Cabinet policy.
The Ministry also handles prosecution of active members of the military. Courts-martial are nominally under the the Ministry, though their duties are discharged independently of the wishes of the Ministry, as the Constitution requires of any judicial authority. Judicial administration (the administration of the decisions of courts-martial) are within the remit of the Ministry, which operates correctional facilities. Cases tried by the Superior Court-martial can be referred to the Supreme Court for further resolution under the authorization of the Ministry, though at that point the case will be outside of the court-martial system.
The Military Technology Institute is the premier military technology development institution in China, responsible for researching defence technology. Offensive weaponry is not developed at this facility during peacetime, as part of a commitment to Cabinet policy not to wage offensive wars.
The Military Staff Headquarters, which is an organization established under the Ministry to ensure inter-branch coherence and co-ordination, drafts military proposals and submits them to the Ministry for approval. There is a dedicated internal department in the Ministry that checks proposals for administrative and budgetary difficulties that they foresee; in principle, civil servants do not alter the proposal, but affix their comments or objections to it; this is done out of respect for the expertise of military officers. If a given proposal finds no difficulty in the Ministry, it is delivered to the Minister for his approval and sent back to the MSH for implementation; if a proposal is considered "administratively impracticable", the Minister is likely to ask the Defence Staff to revise it. Theoretically, the Ministry staff can develop military proposals by itself, though this is in practise not done so as not to usurp the role of the Defence Staff.
The Ministry is staffed with around 1,000 officials, all civil servants, with the sole exception of the Secretary of State and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, who are ministers. While the Ministry is often criticized for its efficiency, it is actually one of the fastest of all civilian agencies. Documents delivered marked Most Urgent can expect to be processed within a single working day; this category is used for the most time-sensitive military commands that require approval from the Ministry.
Restored in 1994 after the air raid of 1991
New MSH building to the left
The Defence Staff is the supreme military agency in the land and directly accepts instructions from the civilian superior commander, the Secretary of State for Defence. The principal task of the Defence Staff is to elaborate administrative instructions from the Ministry into military command to be implemented by the subordinate headquarters. As an agency, the Defence Staff is not part of any other branch of service, but considered a branch unto itself. The head of the Defence Staff is the Chief of the Defence Staff, who, aside from his position as the ranking commander of the entire armed forces, is the chief executive to the Defence Secretary.
The structure of the Defence Staff is highly flexible according to the present needs of military command. During times of war, it is known to take up additional officers seconded from other branches, as advisors and liaison officers. The scope of operation of the Defence Staff is also dependent on the disposition of the Defence Secretary; most Defence Secretaries after the '60s have elected to take a hands-off approach to the Defence Staff as far as military command is concerned. In terms of personnel, the Defence Staff is roughly the same size as the Ministry of Defence.
The modus operandi of the Defence Staff is best understood in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence; the Defence Staff envisions and drafts, and the Ministry checks and decides. Almost everything the Defence Staff does is subject to ministerial approval, either before or after the fact. During peacetime this relationship is never strained, but during war the Defence Staff is often at odds with the Ministry, particularly with the civilian staff in it. As proposals are routed through the Ministry staff before reaching the Defence Secretary, the civilian staff (rightly or wrongly) often finds many objections, mostly on grounds of administrative impracticability or budgetary infeasibility, against the Defence Staff's proposals; thus, they are rejected by the Minister outright or revised to an extent that the Defence Staff considers unacceptable in its own mind.
This conflict is actually part of the design of the system, as the original architect elaborates in his memoirs: The leave to draft, to imagine, and to propose is to belong to the military officers, who are selected to serve in the Defence Staff for their proven merit and military savvy; thus, proposals would contain the best and most proven, most advantageous of doctrines. The authority to evaluate alternatives and to censor for errors is vested in civilian officials, who are selected for their impeccable sense in preventing pitfalls and unparalleled attention to detail, at the same time at leisure for time and unpressed for performance; they can reliably ascertain that no plan will go forth without firm civilian support, which is central to the success to any modern military operation. Finally, the power to accept and reject is held by the political minister, who is monitored by the nation, constantly subject to their scrutiny, who ultimately can be expected to make the decision that the people want, such as natural in a democratic republic.
Army
The Army is the primary land-based branch of the entire military; it is responsible for all operations on land, by default. Formations are distributed, with emphasis on borders, along the territory of China. The Army also has a few units that permanently are stationed in foreign countries, with the consent of the national government whose territory they are on.
The commander of the Army is officially titled Supreme Commander of the Army, and ex-officio has the rank of a full general, equivalent to 4 stars (in reality, Plum Blossoms are used in lieu of stars in the Republic of China). He is responsible for the day-to-day running of the Army, and within his duties has plenary commanding power over the Army with regards to operations, tactics, and strategy. The Army Headquarters is the commander's personal staff, giving him advice on the performance of his duties and exercise of his powers. [Structure of the Army Headquarters coming up.]
Subordinate to the Supreme Army Commander are 6 Regional Army Commanders, who are based in Nanking, Peking, Hsi-an, Chung-king, Kwangchow, and Ta-lien. They are regionally responsible for the defence of their designated areas of responsibility; all 6 regions either have borders with other countries or contain specific areas of interest or risk. Further subordinate to the Regional Army Commanders are District Army Commander. There are roughly 3 to 5 Districts to each Region. Under the Districts are individual formations attached to the District. Formations directly attached to the District are usually corps or independent divisions.
The Chinese Army is widely acknowledge to be one of the world's most powerful land forces, for her versatility and mobility, if not in just the sheer size of the body. In modern times, defence policy focuses on the quality of troops instead of the quantity thereof, and out of the several branches of service, the Army usually has the most attention of the Ministry of Defence. That attention is due to the Army's share of the defence budget, from which the Army takes the lion's share at roughly 40% each fiscal year.
Defence policy until the '90s focused on land defence, or, in other words, the repulsion of invasion that arrive by way of the sea. The Navy's role was thus to prevent enemy units from coming ashore, and that of the Army, to repel them once they are ashore. The widespread dispersal of the units of the Army is meant to effect continuous resistance against landed enemies, who are bound to spread very thin due to the size of the Central China Plains. Against a spearhead invasion, China maintains several highly mobile units (equipped with aircraft to ensure speedy deployment) at the field army level in anticipation of enemies that do not seek to occupy China wholesale. The Navy is responsible for defending China's waterways, however far inland those water bodies are.
After the '90s, defence policy shifted to give attention to unconventional warfare. The collapse of fascist Germany and Korea in 1990 and dissolution of the USSR in 1992 rid China of her major territorial-based enemies, actual or imaginary. Instead of planning and rehearsals against full-scale invasions, one of the primary focuses of the Army is now anti-terrorism. As fascist governments faded, core, militant remnants of those former governments have many times threatened China's security. The most apparent example of terrorism in China is the Air Raid of 1991, in which fascist rogue pilots of the Korean Air Force, without authorization, bombed China's capital city in January that year.
Unable to declare war against Korea, a disagreement ensued in China's (charred) government as to which agency was responsible for the attacks that happened in 1991. The Ministry of Defence's position was that it was solely responsible for aggression from other states, not "bandits and rogues" such as those that attacked the capital city. Nevertheless, the National Defence Act (fundamental legislation for defence structure) was amended in 1994 to charge formally the Ministry of Defence with the task of anti-terrorism, which it found profoundly difficult. During the transition, further pro-fascist extremist groups from Korea and Denmark attacked China multiple times in the mid-'90s.
Army Specializations:
Staff
Infantry
Cavalry
Mechanized infantry
Artillery
Communications
Note 1: Under these District Commands are independent divisions (ND), not corps (C).
Note 2: Operating in Vietnam.
Note 3: Operating in Vietnam. Headquartered in Hue.
Formations in [square brackets] are called up from reserves.
Navy
Closed to the public for "security reasons"
The Navy is the branch of the armed forces responsible for defending China from threats on the coasts, high seas, and rivers. It is also the conveyor of resources, including personnel, to distant locations where they are required. Formations (fleets in naval terminology) are distributed on the coastlines and banks, as appropriate.
The commander of the entire Navy is called the Supreme Commander of the Navy, and has, as his Army counterpart, the ex-officio rank of a full admiral. While term Admiral is written in exactly the same way as General in Chinese, this distinction is made when writing in English. This officer is directly answerable to the Secretary of State for Defence.
The Navy is the second most populated of the three combat branches of service (there are five other branches, but they are not directly responsible for combat).
The Chinese Navy saw enormous investment and growth starting from the early '50s. The growth was spiked by a change of paradigm from the Ministry of Defence, which saw Japan, with her relatively powerful Imperial Japanese Navy, as China's primary threat to peace. China lavished princely sums in order to develop her own battleships and aircraft carriers, though the Japanese were able to achieve those objects ahead of their Chinese counterpart by the space of a few years. By the time the Chinese Navy actually acquired the ability to manufacture her own capital ships, Sino-Japanese relations had reached a point where they are not necessary anymore. As such, in the mid-'60s, the Navy's funding was diminished by quite a bit, and her operation fell into relative obscurity, until the '80s.
The renewal of national attention in the Navy came about as a heightened weariness of the rapidly expanding Korean Navy, in spite of assurance from the Korean military government that they harboured no ill intentions against China. They did, however, defeat the Soviet Navy at sea decisively in 1981. This was bad news as the Soviet Navy had been supplying China with intelligence all over the world for the '70s, due to good relations between China and the USSR. When the USSR was attacked by a Korean-German coalition in '77, China declined to assist either party officially, but unofficially credited the USSR's accounts in Western Europe under the guise of state-owned corporations. Neither the Koreans nor Germans officially criticized China for this, but they knew full well that there is no possibility China would ever support the annihilation of the USSR: this would mean sharing a direct border with Germany and an extended one with Korea, and both Korea and Germany had expansionist policies in place that China was not sure the annexation of the USSR would satiate.
In 1979, due to China's efforts to fund Soviet military operations and purchases, the war gradually tilted back to the centre, with the USSR unable to recapture all her former territories but ready to hold off additional infringement from the Korean-German alliance. It ground to a stalemate in early 1980, at which time China brokered a peace deal with the three powers. The Germans and Koreans had planned to annexe the whole of the USSR and divide her along the 110th longitude. China proposed that the USSR be permitted to exist between the 120 and 80 longitudines. This deprived the USSR of a warm-water port, which meant that China could no longer rely on the USSR Navy (which was virtually destroyed at this point) to defend the northerly waters for her, hence the renewed prominence of the Chinese Navy.
List of Specializations:
Navigation
Telecommunications
Ordnance
Masts
Radar
Sonar
Missiles
Electronics
- Supreme Navy Headquarters NANKING
China Sea Coastal Fleet (1F) SHANGHAI
Po-hai Sea Coastal Fleet (2F) ANTUNG
Yellow Sea Coastal Fleet (3F) TIENTSIN
Pacific Coastal Fleet (4F) FUCHOW
South China Sea Coastal Fleet (5F) KWANGCHOW
Southern Pacific Fleet (6F) HAWAII (abolished)
Pacific Fleet (7F) HAWAII¹
Note 1: Naval Base in Hawaii leased from the Federal Government of the United States,
commencing Jan. 1, 1960. This is also the only fleet equipped with aircraft carriers.
Naval organizations, unlike army ones, are highly mobile and frequently altered. Ships often are grouped and re-grouped for specific tasks at hand.
Air Force
The Air Force is the branch of service responsible for China's aerial defences, and consequently for all engagements in air.
China's air defences, akin to the naval and army ones, is primarily divided into regions of responsibility, due to the sheer size of the country. Rugged terrain, much of which can be unsettled and even outright uninhabitable, also are prominent factors in determining the areas of responsibility of each command post. As airplanes must have a level section of runway to take off and land, and also that they have limited range and sustainability once airborne, the Air Force, in terms of deployment of combat elements, is bound to either land or naval vessels.
The Air Force is also the youngest and least populous branch of the three branches responsible for combat.
Current defence policy places emphasis on the Air Force as never before. This development arose as a result of the termination of the Korean-Soviet War of 1979~1984 and the shift in Korean defence policy resultant thereof. The Korean government, having both German support as well as captured Soviet air arsenal, in the mid-'80s possessed one of the world's most powerful air forces, eclipsing even the Imperial Japanese Air Force, which was recognized as the nonpareil of Asia until this point. The Korean Air Force especially specialized in the art of air raids, with which they rained down destruction on remaining Soviet cities, which forced even more concessions as the '80s dragged on.
With the Soviet Union out of the way, the Korean government also established numerous air bases on former Soviet territory, giving them a completely clear route of flight over to China, since most of her norther border with the USSR, over the plains of Mongolia, was undefended militarily. In more remote regions, the border were even unpatrolled and unmarked, more akin to an invisible line only seen on maps. To station anti-aircraft installations over these areas would be prohibitively expensive. To account for possible Korean invasion by air from the north, the Chinese government installed two entirely new air fleets stationed in the Northeast and in Mongolia, hoping to provide at least some defence against the Korean Air Force.
These efforts were for the most part untested as to their effectiveness; however, in 1991, as the fascist government in Korea collapsed, rogue Korean pilots did in fact conduct a successful air raid on Jan. 17th, 1991. The guilty pilots, who resented the new, liberal government for removing the military's dominance in domestic and foreign policy, secretly took off with their aircraft and took the sea route to eastern China and dropped fourteen bombs over Nanking, the capital city. The east of China was defended, but mostly against the Imperial Japanese Air Force, and was not warned against Korean invasions from that direction. In the ensuing carnage, the Korean pilots were able to return to Korea, where they were arrested and court-martialed. The Air Force was able to detect the approaching Korean pilots, but preliminary reports failed to reach the Secretary of State for Defence, who was in a Cabinet meeting at that time. Even after the bombs had detonated, the Air Force did not react at all, permitting the pilots to escape unscathed, since the National Defence Act of 1948 stated, "The Armed Forces, or any part or unit thereof, shall not engage with any foreign force during time of peace, except with the expressed authorization of the Ministry of Defence."
During the event, the highest officers of the Chinese government, including the President and Vice President, as well as most of the Cabinet, were incapacitated, rendering the Chinese state paralyzed. The press, both domestic and foreign, was required not to publish the full scale of the destruction and were not given any information. Three days later, on the 20th, it was revealed that the Prime Minister and the Secretaries of State for the Interior, Defence, Transport, and Judicial Administration had perished during the raid, and the rest sustained light to moderate injuries. A large number of the administrative staff working in the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Defence also were killed or injured, and the chain of command was not restored to operation until the 22nd, when the President finally regained consciousness and ordered the Foreign Secretary to act as Prime Minister and the Finance Secretary to deputize as the Defence Secretary, who by law held the devolved power of the commander-in-chief.
If it had been a smaller breach, the Air Force would have been heavily and publicly chastised for it, even though this debacle wasn't entirely its own fault. The scale of the affair and the implications thereof prevented the government from taking firm steps against the Air Force or any other branch of the military, since it would imply such a gross failure of the chain of command that China would be exposed as vulnerable to all manner of invasion from all surrounding states. Despite best efforts to pretend that nothing has happened (diplomats were still received and press conferences held), the damage was unconcealable. In 1993, the new government was forced by public opinion to call a National Defence Structure Conference with the object of empowering the defence forces to defend the country in the event of a failure of the nature of the raid of 1991. This will be discussed in further detail at another opportunity.
The Supreme Commander of the Air Force, as his peers in the other branches, holds the rank of a full Air General, though this is written exactly the same way as "Admiral" and "General" in Chinese. The distinction is made when writing in English.
List of Specializations:
Flight
Missile
Electronics
Navigation
Supreme Air Force Headquarters NANKING
- Eastern Command (1M) TIENTSIN
Northeast Command (2M) TALIEN
Pacific Command (3M) SHANGHAI
Southwest Command (4M) CHENGTU
Southern Command (5M) KWEILIN
Northern Command (7M) TIENSHUI¹
Note 1: Has secondary bases in four locations, due to the unusually large area of responsibility.
Reserve Organization
The Reserve Headquarters (RHQ) was established in 1970 by legislation with the amalgamation of a number of units of different origins into a single military organization. Prior thereto, each of the three branches (army, navy, air force) administered its own reserves units, order of battle, reserve training, rotations, calling to service, etc. under the instruction from the Internal Department of Reserve Units in the Ministry of Defence.
The reserves system in China was left in largely a state of chaos until reforms in the 1980s. Many reserve units existed on paper, but no names were attached to them. Theoretically, names would be drawn from the list of reservists and assigned to a unit ad hoc, and all reservists were supposed to participate in annual training sessions, but this rarely happened, and no penalties were imposed for absence. Since reserve units were not actually staffed, the Ministry found it very difficult to communicate with reservists in an organized manner. Furthermore, the Ministry also had to design its own curriculum and schedule to keep the reservists in condition fit for service once called upon, a task for which civil servants proved rather ineffective. The "Fruit Scandal" is one such case of the civil service mismanaging reserve units: a particular unit was commanded to practise "throwing grenades", while a crate of durians (a fruit) arrived.
The Reserve Headquarters was established to counteract these difficulties. The Ministry also provides a schedule upon which the Supreme Reserve Headquarters can call dormant units into active service on its own authority. Before then, it was a criminal act to call a dormant unit into service without appropriate authorization (from the Ministry).
The substructure of the RHQ is mirrored from civilian government. For each provincial government, there is a local command centre accountable to the RHQ, but attached and close co-operating with provincial military administration agencies. Under each local command centre, there exist local service stations, which are attached to county governments. The cause for such close parallelism to civilian government is due to the fact that many operations, including the drafting and examination of recruits, are physically handled by local government, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior.
As of now, China has abolished universal military service, but all able-bodies males from the age of 18 until 40 are still considered enlisted and automatically placed on reserve, not "in active duty"; the units on active duty are mostly professional soldiers. Reservists are periodically summoned up to report to their nearest service centres to keep them informed about the security of the nation as well as anything they would be expected to do should they be called into active service. These rotations typically do not last more than a week per annum, and for the time they spend in barracks, they are still considered "on reserve", though they will be uniformed to some extent. Placing them on active duty for such a short period of time would warrant too much administrative effort.
Another problematic issue regarding military service is exemption. According to national law, there are many situations under which a person can either defer performance of military service (when that was in effect), perform national service as an alternative, or be exempt entirely. In these cases, they are still considered on reserve. In more extreme cases, a person might be exempt even from enlistment, in which case the state cannot charge them with duty of any kind. Exemptions are granted fairly liberally in China, though not too many qualify choose to claim them, as service is actually a decently-paying job. From time to time, the granting of exemption from enlistment to ministers' family members scandalously appear, but they typically blow over within a short space of time like most Chinese military scandals.
Unified Logistics Service
Spared during the air raid of 1991
This military body was created in 1943 on the advice of American advisors to streamline and make efficient the procurement process by professional handling of issues in logistics; the lack of such professionalism had plagued the Chinese forces in the '30s. Logistics were once managed by division level commanders, but by this body, they are centralized. Like the Army, under the Supreme Headquarters there are geographical areas of responsibility to which local units are attached, so they will always receive supplies from the closest possible source and avoiding the awkward situation of a long domestic supply line when another, more local source was available.
The ULS more closely co-operates with local authorities than any other HQ. Under the Ministry of Defence, departments of military administration are a mandatory establishment in each province. While these departments are technically under their respective provincial governments, most of the activity that they perform are under the instructions of the Ministry of Defence, as defence is technically a exclusively central portfolio. The ULS and its subordinates make arrangements with each department of military administration for local supply.
The role of departments of military administration is not limited to procurement of supplies; they also administer reservists on behalf of the Ministry of Defence and are responsible for calling up conscripts when they are required by the Ministry of the Interior. In this role, these departments are similar to joint service centres of multiple government agencies, civilian and military; they are useful for avoiding redundancies in government. The ULS also supports the forces in many key aspects.
List of Specializations:
Medicine
Pharmacy
Veterinarian
Music
Judicial
Construction
Machinery
Finance
Administration
Politics
Survey
Digital
Transport
Post
Military Police Supreme Headquarters
Despite the inherent limitations of the Military Police as an independent force, this HQ remains heavily vested with authority, since the discipline of the armed forces is enforced by it. Military Police units are subject to especially stringent behaviourial requirements, and recruits must pass additional screening to ensure that they can be entrusted with their powers. Military Police, unlike the civilian police forces, usually have access to firearms without special authorization.
In particularly important locations, the Military Police has been known to co-operate with local police forces to maintain public order in extraordinary circumstances or when active service personnel are implicated in disputes away from their stations.
Rotation of Commissions and Random Reformation
The rotational system of commission is part of an elaborate effort by the central government ensure that there will not be factions forming in the military that could threaten civilian control of the military and government policy implementation. All commanders of formations are subject to rotation. Commanders of Battalions, Brigades, and Regiments are rotated once every three years. Commanders of divisions and corps are rotated once every two years. Commanders of all units above are rotated every year. Not only does this prevent a commander from alienating the loyalty of the formation to himself, it also provides for plenty of opportunities where officers' performance can be assessed, and the officer himself to be promoted or demoted accordingly.
In 1960, this system was bolstered with a mandatory holiday rule, which provides that field officers and general officers are to take a 3-month holiday every single year, fully paid for by the state, in which they have no commission and are at liberty to take training courses or go for a vacation with their families.
Initially, this rule was greeted with praise from the general public, still weary of warlordism that plagued China for four decades after the abdication of the final imperial dynasty. To the military, however, this was the final step in guaranteeing civilian supremacy over the military, not merely civilian control.
to the rotation policy
The Petition of 1961 was addressed by a number of very senior and decorated officers to the Ministry of Defence, stating that this plan, which separates the commander from the unit, may come to be the undoing of national defence completely. They contend that, if officers cannot develop a relationship with the unit, the unit will not support the officer in action. The petition was accepted by the Ministry, with the subsequent decision that a new class of sub-offiers, titled warrant officers, were to be introduced to the system.
Warrant officers were not officially officers, but they would have relative permanence and prominence in the formation, and supply the actual commander with what he lacks in relationship with his formation. In order to prevent warrant officers from warlordism, every unit above the battalion level would have a committee of warrant officers supporting its commissioned officer.
Unit reformation is a policy that Chiang Kai-shek presented to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1956. At this point, which the military is nominally nationalized, personal influences have not yet been completely severed yet, and the severance of these ulterior connections have been delayed by Chiang's own refusal to part with troops that he considers his most supportive — the Wampoa units. Chiang has been adamant about abolishing such ties in other commanders, and to one degree or another he had successes, but other major factions have been uneasy about compliance to such a policy if Chiang himself isn't relinquishing his Wampoa units. In 1956, he was ready to relinquish his troops, but he was to make sure that once he gave them up, nobody retained them. To this effect, he instituted the Random Reformation policy, which basically involved giving each individual serviceperson a completely random assignment to completely new units.
Such a drastic policy was initially unable to be accepted at the Central Executive Committee, hence it never made its way to Cabinet during Chiang's premiership. Under Yu, whose support base did include involve the military, this policy was again brought up and forcefully implemented. The 4-million-strong Chinese Armed Forces was completely mixed by Yu's policies, including every last member of Chiang's Wampoa units. To ensure that no regional alliances would form, Yu voided all random assignments within one's original province, e.g. if one was serving in Canton and the lottery again assigned one to Canton, one had to draw again, until one was assigned to beyond the province. It encountered major but no organized resistance.
The reformation was finalized in 1960, and Yu instructed the Ministry of Defence to ensure that utterly nobody was to remain in their old positions, or even to find a former colleague, even by sheer luck in the lottery. On the day the reformation was to take effect, a poet described China as "undergoing a mass exodus." This actually fairly significantly impacted China's demographic, as more than 4,132,000 people had to move to different parts of the country to report to their new offices. In objection against this policy, many officers resigned and personnel requested to be discharged; Yu granted all these requests, as he was planning to slim down the military anyway. In most sources, this re-organization was the point where the armed forces were genuinely nationalized, old loyalties shattered, along with unit coherence and camaraderie.
If once wasn't enough, when Yen came to the premiership in 1963, one of his first plans was to randomize yet again; however, with the advice of the Finance Secretary, he shelved this plan due to the costs that moving millions of people across the country would again entail.
Discipline
The Chinese Army is renowned for its good discipline in the most part; yet, there remain a stubborn few units that refuse to exhibit good conduct. If a civilian (domestic or foreign) witnesses misconduct, he is encouraged to write to the Ministry of Defence, which has a dedicated panel of jurists processing such allegations, in which the reporter does not need to be party. The Ministry of Defence is responsible in foreign territory for the damage the soldiers do to foreign civilians. Once the misconduct has been identified, the Ministry of Defence will make a suitable reparation and penalize the offending party if necessary.
For minor public offences against the peace, the commanding officer of a division can hold courts-martial to try the offence ad hoc; for major offences, the accused will be transported to Nanking to answer to charges. In courts-martial, the commanding officer with two peers, invited from neighbouring divisions, are judges of fact and law. The maximum penalty a commanding officer could dole out is 100 days' imprisonment, combined with a fine equal or less than 3 months' pay for the offender. If a commanding officer is reported for misconduct or abuse of power, he will answer to these charges before the Supreme Court-martial in Nanking within 80 days.
The Supreme Court-martial is held in Nanking, and serious offences of soldiers as well as commanding officers are tried here. A panel of 4 (for ordinary personnel) or 6 (for commanding officers) judges preside, and no jury is impanelled. Of the 4 (or 6) judges, 3 (or 4) must concur to convict. The maximum sentence here is 15 years in prison, with or without discharge. If the judges do not concur, the defendant is acquitted. The defendant is permitted to have counsel.
If the defendant is dissatisfied with the judgment, he may petition the Court-martial of Appeals be convened to correct an error in law in the judgment of the Supreme Court-martial. The State may not petition the Court-martial of Appeals. The Court-martial of Appeals has a single division of 12 justices who hears all appeals. In this Court, evidence is submitted in affidavit, and verbal presentations do not occur unless the Court so orders.
The decisions of the Court-martial of Appeals are final, unless it refers its own decision to the Court of Error and Appeal.
Serious offences are those that may entail a maximal penalty of more than five years in prison in civilian law.
Honours
A serviceperson who demonstrates extraordinary merit in any official activity can be eligible for an honour. An extensive system of honours is maintained by the government to reward servicepersons who "go above and beyond" their expected performance or sacrifice. There are two types of honours: orders and decorations. Orders are conferred by the President upon the advice of the Defence Secretary, while decorations are distributed by the Ministry itself. Orders take precedence over decorations.
Orders
Other orders include the Order of the Sacred Tripod, the Order of Cloud and Banner, and Order of Loyalty and Diligence. All three of the foregoing are divided into nine classes, with First Class being the highest and Ninth Class the lowest. The specific class being granted, other than in respect of the scale of the merit recognized, depends on the officer's rank. General officers are rewarded with classes 1 to 4, field officers with 4 to 7, and junior officers with 7 to 9. Classes 1 to 3 are awarded with the Grand Cordon (a sash worn from the right shoulder draping to the left hip), 4 to 6 with Cravat (worn on neck), and 7 to 9 with Ribbon (dangling from lapel). Warrant and non-commissioned officers are usually not rewarded with orders under normal circumstances; when they are, they qualify for only Ninth Class. After an order has been awarded, the order does not promote with rank; if additional merit exists, an existing order can be promoted, but generally speaking a single person cannot have two classes of the same order simultaneously.
Decorations
For lesser merits, a plenitude of decorations exist to acknowledge more specific types of service. Except for a limited selection of decorations common to all branches, most decorations are specific to members of one branch. The Ministry of Defence rubberstamps recommendations gathered by each branch's HQ.
The unauthorized granting or forging of orders (but not decorations) is an offence. Only the Ministry of Defence has power to recommend orders, for which it has a specialized department.
Benefits
Members of the armed forces are respected in China, in recognition for their devotion to the safety of the nation.
A member of the armed forces and his immediate family are allowed to shop at designated malls, in which they receive a special discount. The options available at these shopping centres tend to be comparatively limited, though, to the necessities of life and few luxuries. Sales are very uncommon, since not all providers are permitted to sell merchandise at these places.
Officers are also given pensions, which, depending on the rank last held, may be anywhere from 50% (for higher ranking officers) to 70% (for lower ones) of their former salaries. All service personnel are covered by insurance provided for by the state: the National Insurance Plan (against common injuries and accidental mortality), the Labour Insurance Plan (against hazards at the workplace), and Health Insurance (against hospital expenses and guaranteed income during hospitalization).
Children of active and former service persons are given preference at many universities; this preference is nothing upon which one can rely for admission, but ever little percentage point counts for something. There are parents who intentionally enlist to increase the chances of their children's admission into a famous university. The state will subsidize part of their children's tuition at public and private universities.
All servicemen are given special discounts in state-operated transport services. Depending on the service provider, service personnel may qualify for normal concession fare (50% off) or a half-concession (20% or 25% off); part of this concession is reimbursed by the state. If travelling on official business, officers and service personnel qualify for the following standards of service.
Rank | Travelling allowances |
General Officers | may travel first class in railways or airplanes. |
Field Officers | may travel second class in railways or business class on airplanes. |
Junior Officers | may travel third class in railways or economy class on airplanes. |
Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers | may travel third class in railways or economy class on airplanes. |
Equipment
Uniforms
The Chinese Armed Forces had several uniform overhauls in the past; the situation here represents the uniform regulations that took effect in 1953 and altered (for economy) in 1981, the longest-standing system to date. During the WWII, the Chinese military had little funds to make itself look presentable, but as of 1950 the Chinese economy was not only recovering swiftly but rising into new heights; thus, the government was of the opinion that the new dress code should reflect the newly found prosperity of the nation, so the Ministry of Defence came up with the Schedule of 1951, with the object of making the Chinese military the best-dressed the world.
The following dress codes were provided by the Military Personnel Uniform Dress Code Schedule, 1952 that came into effect on New Year's Day, 1952:
1. Full Dress — This particularly lavish form of dress was based on the court uniforms of the Napoleonic age in France, with its thigh-length coats buttoned up to the neck and folded collars, ankle-length, straight trousers, opera shoes, and cap. The surface material of the outer coat (which covered most of the upper body) was stipulated to be "double-woven silk" (embroidered silk re-embroidered with the same colour to give a glossy/matte contrast), a fabric so extravagant that collusion was suspected between the government and fabric manufacturers. The belt was to be woven gold thread (real 18-karat gold, alloyed with silver) on the surface and white doe skin on the reverse, with a solid silver buckle with enamel emblem of the plum blossom at the centre. Buttons likewise were also made of gold. Rank insignia on the hat, coat, trousers, and shoes were all to be done in gold thread. Epaulettes and aiguillette were also made of gold. Gloves were double-woven white silk on the exterior and satin for the inner facings.
The uniform had but three occasions where its use was sanctioned — attending foreign heads of state, during an audience with the President on New Year's Day, and during one's own appointment ceremony, if the President was presiding. When the uniform schedule was published, most soldiers were outraged by the new uniforms that they had to spend money to tailor; many outright refused to order this uniform. Their rationale was simple: only general-grade officers had an appointment ceremony that the President would preside over, and there simply wasn't the slightest possibility that normal soldiers would be called to attend to a foreign head of state.
After haggling with the Ministry of Defence, the Military Staff HQ assured the soldiers that the Ministry would pay for the uniforms; however, the Ministry soon discovered that providing this uniform (valued at $2,200— in 1953) for every soldier would evacuate the Ministry's coffers. To avoid embarrassment, they introduced an amendment to the Schedule, noting that Full Dress will be "optional", except for general officers, who will be required to purchase this uniform at their own expense. Due to the sparseness of the occasions demanding this form of dress, many less well-off or newly promoted generals elect to eschew its purchase, resorting to hiring it when it was required.
side view
A sash was used to suspend the sword on the wearer's left, which was called the "Horizontal Sword". The origins of this style of sword are ancient, but its general characteristics were codified by the 6th Century. It had no curvature and possessed a single edge, with a sharply-angled, off-centre final. The edge was always blunt to prevent accidents. The sash was around three inches wide and worn relatively loosely around the waist, under the belt. The sash was tied together with an elaborate knot at front, and the excess, left intentionally fraying, was left to hang in front, reaching knee level. The fabric composing the sash was silk, and its colours and patterns varied on the basis of rank and service, republished every single year.
Full Dress was named in Paris as the "World's Most Beautiful Uniform" for 29 consecutive years from 1952 to 1981, when it was withdrawn from mandatory use, in order to economize during a period of national stringency. It is the pride of the Chinese armed forces, though attempts at resurrecting its use have always been foiled for reasons of economy. The reviewers called it, "ornamental but subtle, beautiful and not boastful, creativity in order, artistry in uniformity".
2. Evening Dress — Evening Dress is a fairly standard white-tie dress code that was mandatory for formal evening events. It consists of a special jacket, which is to be made out of tweed in winter and wool in summer. There is a white waistcoat made of silk, with silk-covered copper buttons. Earlier on, removable collars were used, but since the '70s, most officers who have this dress chose to replace it with permanently attached collars and bibs. The trousers are different from the ones used for Full Dress; the Evening Dress trousers are made with suspender tabs attached to the legs, which attached to the front of the trousers. The shoes, however, are shared with Full Dress, though the mini silk frills attached to the shoes on Full Dress were to be removed for Evening Dress.
Style C
The proper headgear for Evening Dress is a top hat, though that fell out of fashion in the '60s, so it was dropped from the Uniform Code revision of 1971. As Evening Dress is more of a social costume, regulations around it are looser and permit more personality than for Full Dress.
Even more than the Full Dress, the Evening Dress was perceived as a symbol of elitism, as soldiers had very few occasions that really would demand a full evening dress. The Army, Air Force, and Military Staff branches use black for Evening Dress, while the Navy uses deep blue. Buttons are gold in all cases, though they do not need to be gold-gilt solid sliver. Annoyingly, Evening Dress requires a sword distinct from the one used for Full Dress.
3. Morning Dress — The daytime equivalent of the Evening Dress. Required when attending formal civilian events where "morning dress" is required. It consists of a grey, knee-length tail coat, a commensurate waist coat of the same colour. The same shirt worn for Evening Dress is used for Morning Dress. As the actual "morning dress" code in civilian settings gradually became obsolete in the '70s, this uniform fell into disuse.
4. Service Dress — This is the normal daytime dress for all servicepersons when discharging official duties before an officer. There are three variants of this dress code, called Styles A B and C. Style A was to be donned while out of garrison, while Style B while on garrison. Both had the same fundamental design, with a peaked cap (seen in the photo to the left), an outer coat fully buttoned up to the neck with flipped collars, and trousers. The button-up coat was inspired by the Sun Yat-sen suit. Both Styles requires dark green for the Army, dark blue for Navy, lighter blue for Air Force, and white for all other branches, with silver buttons. The cap's colour matches the colour of the coat, but a Style A cap has metal-impressed emblem, while on Style B it was to be embroidered with thread. For trousers, A was a straight-cut design, while B more resembled a riding design and narrowed towards the calves: this is meant to match different footwear. A uses normal dress shoes, while B is paired with boots.
It is considered more acceptable to display medals while wearing Style A, while doing the same while in Style B can be construed as boastful, since it is customary only to wear the ribbons of one's honours when with Style B.
Both Styles A and B have summer and winter variants, giving a total of four variations of Service Dress. The precise material used for each variant and padding within could differ region to region, since the south of China could have a temperate winter, while the north can be remarkably frigid. For those garrisons situated in remote locations or inhospitable climates, the HQs of the branches of service customarily issue alternate uniforms to be used when none of the regular dresses meet the needs of servicepersons.
There also exists a Style C of Service Dress. This one has a lounge-suit like, open-collar design, with a dress shirt and tie worn underneath. It is a more recent development borrowed from American armies, introduced for a gentler, more approachable tone, as opposed to the button-up style of Styles A an B, which in China evokes images of bureaucracy. Style C Service Dress does not have a distinction between winter and summer variations. Dress shirts are to be uniformly white with no obvious grain, and ties are to reflect the colour of each branch, though no colour swatch is prescribed. After the deprecation of Morning Dress after the 1970s, Style C is often worn in lieu.
5. Service Undress — This is the normal dress for servicepersons discharging official duty alone or without an officer present. If an officer arrives unexpectedly, servicepersons are not required to change into Service Dress, though if the arrival is scheduled beforehand, they are required to be in Service Dress. Undress generally does not involve an formal jacket, though jackets meant to protect the wearer from the elements have been issued and are in use.
Like Service Dress, Undress is also divided into Styles A, B, and C. Style A is similar to Service Dress Style C, but without the formal jacket. Style B eschews the tie altogether, and Style C replaces the long-sleeve dress shirt with a short-sleeve shirt. Each branch of service also has its own headgear for Undress. For example, the Navy uses traditional sailor caps, while a less luxuriously decorated peaked caps are still standard for Army Undress. For colder weather, all Undress variants can be paired with a standard-issue jumper. Scarves are also allowed while in Undress.
Most branches would prefer that a serviceperson not be in Undress when out of garrison, as many still deem it impolite to turn up without a formal jacket at most events.
6. Combat Uniform — This is not actually regulated by legislation but issued by the Defence Staff according to actual needs of the theatre. Most often it involves some sort of camouflage. It is currently against regulation for service members to appear off base in combat garb, since the public may be alarmed to think that combat is happening in the vicinity. Most often, combat gear is also uncomfortable, placing emphasis on protection and utility instead.
Other Items
Baton. Unlike the German rank system, where there existed a branch-specific five-star rank, the rank of field marshal in China is reserved for the Chief of Defence Staff, the ranking professional military officer. Only he (or she, which happened in 1989~1991) was entitled to a baton; thus, this baton is comparable to the baton of the Maréchal de France, or Marshal of France. Field marshal's insignia, despite representing a five-star rank, consists of four stars encircling a plum blossom, China's national emblem. The body of the baton was made out of sterling silver then plated with gold. Shiny parts are enamel and laquered porcelain.
Fish tag. These are China's version of "dog tags", but only worn with Full Dress. Instead of being worn like a necklace, they are suspended from the wearer's belt, from a string that denote the wearer's rank. Purple stings are for generals, red for field officers, and blue for junior officers. The material of the fish tag is also dependent on the wearer's rank: the Chief of Defence Staff and generals claim gold-plated silver, field officers use pure silver, and junior officers silver-plated bronze. Those under this rank do not use fish tags. Due to the precious metals used, fish tags are a significant expenditure when one is cast.
Like a "dog tag", the fish tag is physically two pieces of metal strung together on the same cord. The side facing outwards are decorated with fish motif, since fish, which do not shut their eyes, are a symbol of vigilance and attentiveness in Chinese iconography. The inner sides of the two pieces are engraved with the name, birth date, rank and position; other vital statistics such as blood type and allergies are also recorded on them. One half holds the information in Chinese, and the other half has English and French, the international languages at that time.
Army Unit Organization
Notes | Unit strength | Chinese unit name | English unit name |
Command | 2 or more Army Groups¹ | 總集團軍、方面司令部 | General Army Group, Theatre Command (TC) |
Command | 2 or more Field Armies | 集團軍、地方司令部 | Army Group, Regional Command (AG) |
Command | 2 or more Corps | 軍團、地方指揮部 | Field Army, District Command (A) |
Formation | 3 Divisions ≈ 40,000 | 軍 | Corps (C) |
Formation | 3 Regiments ≈ 12,000 | 師 | Division (D) |
Formation | 3 Battalions ≈ 4,000 | 旅 | Regiment (E) |
Formation | 1,200 | 營 | Battalion (B) |
Internal formation² | 320 | 連 | Company |
Internal formation² | 80 | 排 | Platoon |
Internal formation² | 20 | 班 | Section |
Internal formation² | 5 | 伍 | Team |
Individual² | 1 | 員 | Soldier |
Navy Unit Organization
Notes | Unit strength | Chinese unit name | English unit name |
Formation | 2 Groups | 艦隊 | Fleet |
Formation | 2 Flotillas | 大隊 | Group |
Formation | 2 Squadrons | 中隊 | Flotilla |
Formation | 4 to 8 ships | 小隊 | Squadron |
Formation | 2 to 4 ships | 分隊 | Unit |
Ship | 1 ship | 艦 | Ship (E) |
Air Force Unit Organization
Notes | Unit strength | Chinese unit name | English unit name |
Command | 2 to 3 Forces | 司令部 | Command |
Formation | 2 to 3 Wings | 總隊 | Force |
Formation | 2 to 3 Groups | 大隊 | Wing |
Formation | 2 to 3 Squadrons | 中隊 | Group |
Formation | 2 to 3 Flights | 小隊 | Squadron |
Formation | 2 to 3 aircrafts | 分隊 | Flight |
Aircraft | 1 aircraft | 機 | Aircraft (E) |
Personnel Ranks and Equivalencies
Note 1/2 — The rank of Field Marshal (or Admiral of the Navy or Air Marshal) can correspond to these two ranks in the Civil Service.
Note 3 — The Marshal-General is the military chief of staff to the President; since the President's commanding authority is ceremonial, the Marshal-General is also a ceremonial position; in this case, the rank of Field Marshal is equal to that of a full Minister or Secretary of State.
Recruitment
Annual entrants of able-bodies males aged 18 are conscripted by the Ministry of Defence to serve a 3-year term in the military at this time (1970). They receive compensation for their service. University graduates are also encouraged to serve in the military, but only for 2 years, in recognition of their superior academic status; professional school graduates are not afforded this privilege. At the end of their terms of mandatory service, they have the option of becoming a professional soldier or be assigned to a reserve unit.
Professional soldiers serve alongside conscripts, but they receive better pay and slightly better accommodation. Upon completing requisite courses in leadership and certain other subjects, professional soldiers have the potential to become non-commissioned officers.
Warrant officers are drawn from exceptional non-commissioned officers, who are exhorted to complete another series of courses, and are thus entrusted with what in other countries would be the exclusive remit of commissioned officers.
Commissioned officers are noticeably rarer in China than in other nations, and commissioned officers, from the very lowest rate (Second Lieutenant), are given command (most commissioned officers are commanders) over at least 300 people. Commissioned officers are drawn from qualifiers in discriminating examinations held by the Examination Yuan under normal circumstances; warrant officers rarely cross the threshold to receive commissions.
Career
About 3% of all conscripts elect to become professional soldiers. These are promoted from Private Second Class to First Class as a matter of course after their first year of service, and then to Special Class after their third year of service. Henceforth, they are encouraged to seek out approved courses in order to gain eligibility for non-commissioned officer status; they will become the commanding officer's (commissioned) aids and transponders, assisting and inspecting the ranks of new recruits, where the commissioned officers is not expected to do this himself.
Experienced NCOs may go on to become warrant officers, though this is a true achievement. Many NCOs do elect to pursue other careers after they age 30 to 35, and it is from the pool of NCOs who do not leave the military at this age that most warrant officers are drawn. Warrant officers may command an internal formation but not an independent formation (battalion level and larger), though the excellent will be drawn as deputies and assistants of much higher commissioned officers. Only the very highest commanders (of a military region, for example) will have other commissioned officers as his deputy and assistants.
Commissioned officers, a completely different breed, follow an greatly different career path; they originate in military schools and other government agencies, as students and officers in the Civil Service. 92% of newly commissioned officers are qualifiers of the national examinations for military officers; another 8% are civilian officers who has requested and obtained a transfer to a military setting. These junior officers are annually appraised by much more exacting standards directly by the Ministry of Defence, and their careers depend on their superiors' remarks, exactly as it would have been had they been in the Civil Service.
Most entrants into officer ranks hold a degree in the National University of Defence, which offers both undergraduate and graduate programs. Enrolment is extremely competitive, with an acceptance rate of only 4%, almost on par with other premier universities in the land, such as Nanking or Central. Only the most academically qualified students from academic secondary schools can hope to enter this prestigious centre of learning. The NUD offers only one undergraduate degree, bachelor of arts, which is founded upon a fairly restrictive core of courses, though students can choose from several major and minor studies. Of these disciplines, logistics is the most prestigious. After obtaining a bachelor of arts, some students choose to challenge the Higher Examinations in defence specialty for immediate commission; others elect to further their qualifications in hopes for higher commissions. In graduate studies, students study one of fifty-seven disciplines, and a master of arts would mean almost certain commission as a major. After this, a doctorate can give one an enormous head start as a lieutenant colonel, but commanding commissions are typically not given as first commissions for new officers. These degrees are highly regarded in civil society, and one's prospect for promotion also depend on one's qualifications. Since 1968, no Chief of Defence Staff has assumed office without a doctorate in defence.
Oaths
I most sincerely declare to the people of the nation that I shall obey the Constitution and legislations, respect the people, remain loyal to the nation, and perform my duties to the best of my abilities, without compromising the trust in me confided by the nation. This is my solemn oath.
Non-Commissioned Oath: 余謹以至誠向全國人民宣誓余必遵守憲法法令敬愛國民效忠國家竭盡能力執行任務輔佐長官無負國家之託付謹誓
I most sincerely declare to the people of the nation that I shall obey the Constitution and legislations, respect the people, remain loyal to the nation, perform my duties to the best of my abilities, and assist my superior officers, without compromising the trust in me confided by the nation. This is my solemn oath.
Commissioned Oath: 余謹以至誠向全國人民宣誓余必遵守憲法法令敬愛國民效忠國家竭盡能力執行業務輔佐長官不逢迎媚上畏懼權勢統領部屬完全責任無負國家之託付如違誓言願受法律制裁謹誓
I most sincerely declare to the people of the nation that I shall obey the Constitution and legislations, respect the people, remain loyal to the nation, perform my duties to the best of my abilities, assist my superior officers without fear or favour, and lead my subordinates with complete responsibility, without compromising the trust in me confided by the nation. This is my solemn oath.
Oath-taking Gesture
The oath-taker may elect to extend his right arm upwards and outwards at an angle in lieu of the Bellamy salute or use the tradition gesture.
Gender Balance and Other Issues
On the whole, the armed forces is predominantly male, who consist of 91% of all personnel. Within the ranks of officers, who account for 0.89% of the entire service, females make up 47%. This is largely due to the fact that officers are rarely promoted from the ranks, but are selected based on merits shown in written examinations and with prerequisite degrees in the National Defence University. Enrolment at the National Defence University is competitive, and male-female balance reached equality briefly in 1999; since then, males have slightly outnumbered females in both enrolment and graduation. The proportion of female officers in service is reaching equilibrium, not having shifted by more than 2% since 1982, but the proportion of female warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers is growing. The ranking professional soldier in China, the Chief of Defence Staff, was female between 1989 and 1991; she went on to become Marshal-General in 1998, the most senior officer, though in a completely ceremonial position.
Language
The armed forces generally require all enlisting personnel to be fluent in Mandarin. Specific roles, such as interpreters and signals listeners, may require additional qualifications in other languages.
Finance
The ROC armed forces is known for its fiscal soundness. Soldiers are considered well-paid, and officers even more so. Internally, there exists a strict, methodological accounting system that utilizes three systems to keep finances in check: the cashiers (出納), the accountants (會計), and the auditors (審計). Cashiers handle transactions upon authorization from a competent officer; after each receipt and expenditure, they leave a certificate with the accountant, who then post the amount to the unit's accounts to reflect this change. Accountants are "independent officers" of the armed forces, whose professional actions are not subject to the command of the unit's commanding officer; they are only subject to the scrutiny of a superior accounting officer in a separate chain of command. At the end of the year, accountants tally and re-tally all the bills posted that fiscal year and complete the clearing report, which states the current financial standing of the unit (including all available funds, assets, and debts, and liabilities) and compares the actual receipts and expenditures with projected ones as in the budgetary measure. The clearing report is then handed over to auditing authorities, who go over the entire account again to screen for errors and misconduct. This procedure is intended to find and eliminate embezzlement and waste, so that money saved could be used towards increased salaries and benefits.
