Commonwealth of Liberty

West Indies Federation - June 1972

Race to the Red House - Part II - March & April

As the election season of 1972 draws closer and closer towards the August date, the machinations of the political arena continue to make headlines across the Federation. The first major twist came in March as the Left Alliance for National Democracy and Socialism broached an invitation to the National Joint Action Committee of Makandal Daaga. Daaga announced his party would stand for election, but he never intended to win, rather he wanted the NJAC to split the vote between the African population of the West Indies by choosing the driving party of the Black Power Revolution rather than the Labor or Democratic party.

Mr Bishop of the Left Alliance however saw the NJAC not as a simple statement but rather a key to winning extra voters. If the LANDS were truly hoping to overpower the standing two parties and the other new parties of the WINP and DAC, he knew that having Daaga as a member of his caucus would attract other voters. Maurice on an ideological level did not like the idea of the election as a whole, but as a man of striking political talent, he knew a opportunity when he saw it. NJAC accepted the invitation and it brought much of Trinidad, St Lucia and Dominica into the fold as strongholds of the LANDS. The addition of the Joint Action Committee added to the alliance a new sect of revolutionaries who saw violent revolution as the sole way for there to be socialism in the West Indies. They pointed to the works of Lenin, Castro and Che as rallying points in the internal sphere. Bishop himself was beginning to be seen as a sort of moderate figure but was popular among the general voters enough to keep him popular in the alliance.

By April the lines were being drawn. Labor held tight control over Jamaica and Barbados and a majority in Trinidad and Tobago as Michael Manley and Eric Williams galvanized their support bases in newly created industrial and small business owners. The Democrats hold St Vincent and Dominica while actively battling on the rest on the lesser antilles sections. Sinanan and Robinson both are neck and neck in St Lucia while the LANDS are drawing up their first major campaign successes in all of the islands.

The PM's Offensive - May & June

The government is always in a position of strength to the rest of the political scene when it comes to elections, the saving grace for Eric Williams in 1967 was a sudden shift in policy and increase in investments which guaranteed him re-election. Now the strategy can be played out once more to his advantage by bringing in new economic bonuses and making as much public work as possible to showcase the effects of the past 5 years of governance. Massive effort began to pave over roads, address water issues or make public visits to the factories and farms as the Prime Minister went on a full PR offensive to win his country's approval.

This effort happened to align just as some Japanese businessmen representing Toyota stepped down in Piarco Airport to negotiate a car manufacturing plant. The move was published far more than it ever would've been otherwise, making headlines in the Guardian and Express as a defining result of Williams' new economic policy and the reforms he enacted over the past 2 years. Not long after this negotiations with London brought in a wealth of investment from the British manufacturing sector. British Leyland, British Steel and the British banking sector all announced they'd press into the West Indies market, yet another timely support boost for the incumbent.

Presidency of Juan Velasco 3: Latin America’s Second Largest Land Reform

1968-1975

| Continuing down the path of reform, President Velasco would make his most significant and devastating reform in Peruvian history. The Peruvian Land Reform Law of 1969 would begin a process of expropriating nearly 22 million acres of land, the largest land exportation in the America’s outside of Cuba.

Prior to 1969, agriculture in Peru was in a state of semi-feudalism. Large land-owning haciendas, and state-owned cooperatives dotted the land employing peasants who paid off most of their goods to their landlords.

Looking to the Soviet Union as a model, all large haciendas and even small holding minifundios would be abolished completely. Instead these lands were collectivized into peasant cooperatives, overseen by state managers.

In order to try to pay off those who lost land, Velasco would hand over Agrarian Bonds, which the state would someday pay back on. Notably, the worth, and timeframe by which these bonds would be paid out were never specified. By the 1990’s, billions in agrarian bonds would sit still left to be paid.

The Death of the Incan Breadbasket

| As predicted by foreign analysts at the time, the Peruvian agrarian economy which had been a breadbasket under the Incan Empire of old, stagnated, and withered under the new arrangement.

With no true economic initiative for the new state-owned collectives, worker productivity slumped as wages rose even as workers’ worked less. Overall between the years of 1968 - 1985, Peru would go from food self-sufficient, to the most food insecure in South America. This also heightened crime as many struggling Peruvians, would turn to coca which had always been a culture crop even since the days of the Inca’s. These crops would be turned into cocaine, any would put Peru directly in the crosshairs of the drug war.

Even in this early state only 50% of the previously landless Peruvians would be “in control” of the now collective land they found themselves on. These state overseen collectives would become notorious for corruption as government managers would constantly pilfer profits, and sell goods on the growing black market. This became increasingly common as inflation increased, and Peruvian money became increasingly worthless.

A common failure of not only Velasco, but Latin American land reform was a genuine failure to support small farmers. These new collectives overseen by the state, never received new technology, mechanization, or even irrigation. It was instead hoped that the mere act of collectivization would prompt development. This would be another enduring failure not rectified till the Fujimori years.

The most enduring legacy of the Revolutionary Government, and President Velasco would be the failed agricultural collectivization, and the years it would take to undo the damages.

K I N G D O M  O F  G R E E C E   •    Β Α Σ Ί Λ Ε Ι Ο  Τ Η Σ  Ε Λ Λ Ά Δ Α Σ

TWO YEARS INTO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION : AGRARIAN ECONOMIC POLICIES, GREEK CENTRE CONSOLIDATES POWER

_{PREPARING FOR TRUE DEMOCRACY, Adriatican Islands}
ATHENS, GREECE — JUNE, 1972


 | Following the end of the Greek military dictatorship, and the subsequent interim government that followed it in December 1969, the Kingdom of Greece is currently transitioning between a military government and a civilian government. Despite the relative stability of the military dictatorship, it was the lack of expression and rights that brought it down, along with the mass arrest of all political enemies of the military. This had incidentally tarnished the name of King Constantine II, who was seen as an absent figure in the nearly six (6) years of military dictatorship. However, support for the Greek political centre had been booming during this time. The interim government was mostly made up of a rag-tag of Greek politicians and military staff, with loose right-wing, centre, and left-wing figures in the uneasy coalition. There were initially hopes for the interim government, with most expecting the return of the former policies of the old Greek Rally (ES) and the National Radical Union (ERE). However, what had happened was a resurgence of military control. With elections initially planned for 1972, which were then moved to June 1974 by the centre-right interim government, led by General Georgios Papadopoulos, support for the interim government had slumped. Chief Minister of the interim government, Georgios Papadopoulos, would release a statement in an attempt to justify the right-wing presence. |

"Η παρουσία της προσωρινής κυβέρνησης είναι εκεί για να χρησιμεύσει ως μετάβαση προς την πορεία της δημοκρατίας. Πρόκειται για μια χώρα σε πορεία προς την πραγματική δημοκρατία και φυσικά πρόκειται για μια ταραχώδη περίοδο. Ωστόσο, μια κυβέρνηση με εμπειρία οκτώ ετών δεν θα χρησιμεύσει ως σωστός διαχειριστής της διαδικασίας; Δεν είναι η λογική επιλογή; Οι αριστερές προσπάθειες αφύπνισης του κομμουνιστικού κινήματος δεν πρέπει να επαναληφθούν, δεν μπορούμε να επιστρέψουμε στο 1963, αντίθετα, πρέπει να κοιτάξουμε προς την εποχή της ειρήνης και της σταθερότητας υπό την ηγεσία του στρατού."

”The presence of the interim government is there to serve as a transition towards the path of democracy. This is a country on route towards true democracy, and this is of course a turbulent time. However, won't a government with experience for eight years serve as a proper caretaker of the process? Is it not the logical choice? Leftist efforts to awaken the communist movement must not occur again, we cannot return to 1963, instead, we must look to the era of peace and stability led by the military."

- Chief Minister of the Interim Government, GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS


 | The once calm Greek society was now divided over the government, specifically its legitimacy as a true "catch-all" government as the people had hoped, given that it was primarily comprised of right-wing and centre-wing moderates and conservatives. With an urgent need to adapt to the growing centre, and some left-wing sentiments, economic policies were ratified — a move pulled by the Greek government to save face. With agrarian-focused economic policies being established in 1971, combined with increased tourism. The shift from an industrial focus to an agrarian focus by the Greek government, led by Economic Minister Ioannis Koulis, resulted in a rather turbulent economic situation, with the Greek economic growth rate in 1971 slowing down to around 1.2%. However, economic growth is expected to boom this year, as the rural focus launched by the Greek government is set to reach new heights, through farming and modern, more sustainable ways of farming. |


 | However, no amount of economic, political, and social reform by the interim government could change the opinion of the Greek people, as their support was slowly gravitating towards the Greek centre. The Greek centre movement was led by Georgios Mavros, serving as a government minister before the 1964 coup. The older Greek generations saw centrism as an evil thing, which ripped apart Greece several times throughout its modern history. However, with more progressive and enlightened figures rising in Greek politics, such as Andreas Papandreou, the leader of Greece's centre-wing movement, centrism and social democracy have become more ideal political thoughts in Greek politics, and have proved popular with the Greek youth. With preparations for the 1974 elections, it was clear that the Greek centre had begun to consolidate its power and influence across the country, and proved to be a serious contender against the waning Greek right-wing. |

_{Written for the RMB Screen of the}
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Maaliskuuta 1st | March 1st

YSN Maanantai 
USSR Monday

 K A H D E N V Ä L I S E T  S U H T E E T 

 Joskus voiton turvaamiseksi, sinun on oltava vihollisen ystäviä.

Sometimes to secure your victory, you need to be friends with the enemy.

THE KREMLIN — EVENING
_{MOSCOW, Zeitenwende}

| The Finnish officials had accepted a formal request from the Soviet Government for a diplomatic visit to Moscow in order to discuss former diplomatic relations, for it has been under relative neglect ever since the Winter War. The Finnish officials walked in on the Kremlin, and had arranged to discuss trade agreements between the two nations, the Finnish, (having hands tied with the Top Secret Estonian SSR Rebellion Help Plan) have had a tough time getting into official soviet relations. The Finnish nation did not wish for Moscow to see them as allies, but rather a stagnate ally who was only there to discuss terms for the sake of economic prosperity, not for the military nor friendship in the subject. The Finnish Embassy in Moscow had been under some controversy since the new Finnish president condemned it fully, while parliament fully opposed him. They believed this would provide a great PR for the newspaper, though this was only for the benefits. They walked in the Kremlin knowing this information, and soon, the diplomats met. . . |

| AATOS HEINONEN ^{_{Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (FINLAND)}}| "Hey. . . Eevi, what do you think the Soviets will think of us?

Aatos had been worried at this point, he had only recently been elected and had no expectation as to what was to come. He already relied on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eevi Anttila, he just called him Eevi, to be the speaker. He was very good on paper, but otherwise. . . a very stressful character was unveiled. The two personalities would show themselves some inconvenient timing, being honest with himself.

| EEVI ANTTILA ^{_{Minister of Foreign Affairs (FINLAND)}} | "Oh, it will be fine Aatos. They invited us, plus, they look like they truly want to become allies, but- ok, you know what? I can just do the talking, how does that sound?"

| AATOS HEINONEN ^{_{Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (FINLAND)}}| That soun-sounds pretty go-od, si-r. . ."

They continued to meet the Premier of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, who had reached out to the formal invite in the first place. Eevi, like Kosygin, was very open to the idea of a open embassy between Helsinki and Moscow, for all benifeits, while Aatos was heavily aligned with the President, and dissaproved of Muscovy actions, still holding resentment from the Winter War, having lost his mother to the war, and such, he was not very open to talk with terms, hence is over reactionary stress. As they walked in, Alexei welcomed them. Soon, Finland began its terms of being a ally.

| EEVI ANTTILA ^{_{Minister of Foreign Affairs (FINLAND)}} | So, we have gotten your invitation Mr. Kosygin, we as representatives and messengers of the Finnish people, are open to your proposals and negotiations.

| The room turned into a stressful enviorment of clauses and terms between the two states, Kosygin was layed back about the whole affair, with the ministers of Finalnd trying to find a common ground for the two states. As clauses flew theroughout the room, proposals were proposed, taken into consideration, and always spat out as too difficult or too close the the USSR, negotiaions reached common ground in the agreement: The Finnish and Soviets were trade partners, though no soviet branded ships were allowed through Finnish part, vice versa with Finland. Aatos seemed layed and relieved about the manner, and they walked out the Kremlin, finally having worked out terms, got ready to drive back to Helsinki and tell of the news. The men returned to a very different Finland, though, with new elections bringing in new polices and new clauses were included. . . |

TO BE CONTINUED . . .

SHŌWA 47 | JULY 1972
佐藤の不幸。 タナカの立ち上がり


Satō Resigns; Tanaka’s Rise

 N I H O N    N O    S H U S H Ō 

オー・スネイル 富士山に登ろう でも、ゆっくり、ゆっくり 

O Snail; Climb Mount Fuji But slowly, slowly!

TOKYO, TOKYO BAY — AFTERNOON
_{THE LAND OF THE RISING SUN, Nippon-Nihon}

Japan’s political establishment has long eliminated prime ministers almost as evenly as Japanese industry’s transistor production. Japan’s ten postwar prime ministers were in their 60s or 70s when they were elected, and most had the same qualifications: samurai ancestry, degrees from the University of Tokyo, years of modest service in government bureaucracies. This tradition was broken when the Diet elected 54-year-old International Trade and Industry Minister KAKUEI TANAKA, Japan’s eleventh prime minister since 1945. Tanaka becomes leader of the world’s third-largest economy without reluctance to promise:

KAKUEI TANAKA, The Prime Minister

“Strong leadership to adapt to a new era” 新しい時代に適応する強いリーダーシップ。

TANAKA’s rise to power could very well put an end to 71-year-old EISAKU SATŌ’s reserved and cautious governing style. The election of Japan’s new prime minister followed his victory in a bitter fight for leadership of the ruling LDP, whose popularity waned in the final years of SATŌ’s 7½-year regime. SATŌ supported his Foreign Minister, TAKEO FUKUDA, for party chairman and prime minister, and his protégé’s rejection by the Liberal Democrats at a convention at Hibiya Hall in central Tokyo was the final shokku. SATŌ’s unhappiness came to a head when Fukuda was defeated by the upstart millionaire, 282 to 190, in the second round. TANAKA’s popularity was not reflected much in the elections, but rather in tension within the party ranks due to the Liberal Democrats’ poor fortunes under the previous prime minister. SATŌ hoped that his final years leading the country would justify the policies he and his predecessors followed for more than two decades. The policies focus on Japan’s total dependence on the U.S. in foreign relations and total dedication to building Japanese industry domestically.

The remnants of SATŌ’s hopes faded more gradually as the Japanese became increasingly dissatisfied with the overcrowding, high prices, and pollution caused by Japan's economic growth. SATŌ’s ambitions were partially frustrated when RICHARD NIXON announced his new economic measures and his trip to China in an unprepared Japan. For all his talk of action, there is no record of TANAKA as an innovator, despite his recognition that Japan was in environmental trouble. TANAKA put forward a proposal to spread out Japan’s highly concentrated industries and create new villages and towns to redistribute the population, also including green belts, an 5,400-mile bullet train railway line, and 6,000 miles of super expressways. However, TANAKA, like Japan’s past prime ministers, is an advocate of continued economic growth. He is also an ambitious newly arrived diplomat whose vague ideas about foreign policy are expressed in uncertain cliches. It remains to be seen whether Japan’s new prime minister will be as skilled in geopolitics as he was in the real estate sector.