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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Союз Советских Социалистических Республик

The Bear Looks South: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Question

_{Медведь смотрит на юг: Советский Союз и афганский вопрос}

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_{(MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2002) - The recent economic picture of the Soviet Union continues to inspire political confidence in the governing reformist wing of the Party. Preliminary estimates by Gosplan and the Council of Ministers estimate that real Soviet GDP growth for 2002 remain on-course at 5.4%, following growth of roughly 5% in 2001. Resource extraction has become one of the primary drivers of this growth, with oil and condensate production approaching 640 million tonnes annually, while natural gas output is expected to approach 860 billion cubic meters, supported primarily by investments into the consolidated production regions of Yamal, Urengoy, Yamburg, Timan-Pechora, and the Caspian. The strategic effort to open up the Arctic to exploitation (primarily via investments into modernizing the USSR’s northern ports) also began to produce tangible results, with geological exploration spending on the rise and the Ministry of Geology and Natural Resources spearheading new survey programs across the Soviet Arctic shelf.}

_{The mineral sector has also seen significant growth, with copper, nickel, palladium, gold, diamond, iron, coal, and rare earths all surging in foreign demand, particularly from industrial economies around the world. While Norilsk and Kola remain key export regions, the Kremlin’s coffers have opened up for new extraction corridors and processing facilities in the Far East, which was a specific policy decision made with the rising Asian economy in mind. Gosplan’s guidance has allowed the government to eliminate old Soviet policy of exporting raw materials while importing higher-value manufacturing work (like processing), with the Industries Ministry tying preferential tax treatment and government infrastructure access to domestic processing to encourage new mining companies and joint ventures to refine, smelt, and engineer within the Soviet Union.}

_{As a result, Soviet merchandise exports are expected to break USD 180 billion this year in a record-breaking export fiscal year for the government, though shifts are still expected due to commodity prices and the value of the partially convertible ruble. While (as aforementioned) the Soviet Union remains a “resource-centric” economy, more advanced products like chemicals, transport equipment, aerospace products, and nuclear technology are taking on a growing share of Soviet exports. This newfound wealth has flowed into white collar sectors, with employment in fields like IT, engineering, finance, telecom, scientific research, and professional services growing by an average of 33% from 1997-2002. Valentin Pavlov, one of the Soviet Union’s top economic thinkers, has argued that this abundance of resources allows the USSR to spur on its modernization efforts to the chagrin of his conservative counterparts, who have long expressed concerns (most of which have been dismissed) over the entry of foreign joint ventures and semi-private Organizations into the USSR’s so-called resource economy.}

_{The perennially weakened and de-sized conservative wing of the Party, still led by Yegor Ligachev, no longer challenges the enduring success and popularity of economic reforms, and any talk of restoring the rigid pre-Kosygin command economy has disappeared. Their argument has instead transformed into one that adopts the socialist market economy, foreign trade, and foreign investment, while arguing that the Soviet Union’s economic liberalization must be matched by strategic discipline and by consistent support for socialist values around the world through the armed forces and strategic partnerships.}

_{Afghanistan is a very specific case study of their ideology. The direct intervention by the United States and Iran in Afghanistan triggered deep suspicion and concern in Moscow, since the effort directly undermined the strategic assumptions that formed the foundation of Soviet policymaking in Central Asia. While Afghanistan sits outside Soviet sovereign territory, its political developments have often seen spillover effects within the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik SSRs, though this has been greatly minimized since the early 90s thanks to concerted efforts to deploy the Red Army to shutter the porous border with Afghanistan to prevent the spread of radicalism. The main issue Party conservatives took with this policy of hands-off enforcement of Soviet security is that the strategy would only really work provided that other powers respected the same limits. This tenuous reality became a thing of the past when a large-scale foreign military operations unfolded in a state directly bordering the USSR.}

_{Gorbachev’s government certainly considered their response a success. Military infrastructure in southern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan were reinforced, and an additional 30,000 personnel in new or rotational assignments across the region were dispatched. The Soviet Union, they said, would not be dragged into an unnecessary Middle Eastern war that would likely burden the government and its ability to continue on its growth trajectory. Conservatives countered with their fears that the Soviet military’s excessive passiveness had created a geopolitical environment where the armed forces were viewed more as an observer rather than an active participant in the Union’s own security. Nonetheless the conservatives were cautious about their criticism and their own alternative proposals, with no talk of returning to the USSR’s past as an expeditionary warfare state or deploying hundreds of thousands of troops into Afghanistan. They instead argued that the intent of Kosyginite military reforms were intended specifically to create a military that was economically sustainable in such a way that it could be used when absolutely necessary. A statement repeated by Ligachev in private meetings and memorandums read, “A lean military that is never employed is strategically indistinguishable from a military that does not exist.”}

_{Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev is a moderate supporter of this line of thinking. While not a conservative in the old ideological sense, his service at the head of the Strategic Rocket Forces throughout much of the military reorganization and redefinition process in the 1990s transformed him into an advocate for integrated command systems and a revamping of Soviet strategic doctrine, centering on clarity surrounding when and how the Soviet Union is prepared to project its force capabilities. Throughout this year, the General Staff formed an ad hoc committee to examine various “contingency scenarios” for the “Southern strategic direction,” including the deployment of brigade-level formations in Uzbekistan and forward positioning new air units in the region as part of a larger doctrine known as “limited strategic operations beyond the state frontier.” (“ограниченные стратегические операции за пределами государственной границы”)}

_{In the meantime, any political changes have been leapfrogged by a reassessment of the military’s approach to deployments in Central Asia. The General Staff has tentatively approved a new plan for the establishment of a Southern Strategic Readiness Group, which consolidates high-readiness formations in the region under a unified command structure and contingency plan. It comprises around 35,000 total personnel and will be backboned by the 108th Guards Motor Rifle Division, currently based in Termez, along with new Strategic Air Wings consisting of Il-76 and An-124 strategic transport aircraft. The tentative approval was made with the geographic sensitivity of the situation in mind. With foreign interventions still deeply unpopular within the Party’s leadership, there is no appetite to stage war against Iran, however heavily backed by Washington they may be. Instead, efforts are focused on a plan to improve the Soviet’s ability to act in the event of an emergency, not to act immediately in the first place.}

_{While not technically opposed to the reassessment, Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva (a prominent architect of Gorbachev’s foreign policy) has historically defended Moscow’s handling of Afghanistan as an example of “responsible restraint and commitment to Afghan interests.” She has long testified before Party officials that the Soviet Union cannot claim to have overcome the economic and strategic strains of the early Cold War only to recreate it at the start of the new century by bogging itself down in a military conflict. “The Soviet Union’s interests are adequately defended in a strategic context through our extensive, unrivaled military presence in Kurdistan, Syria, and East Eritrea, where the United States and other Western powers cannot dream of such levels of camaraderie and partnership,” Otunbayeva once told members of the Party Committee for Foreign Relations.}

_{It is against this political background that Party officials appeared stiffer than usual as they watched rows upon rows of tanks, missiles, and soldiers march through Red Square for the annual October Revolution celebrations. The military had come far, with the Orel-class of nuclear aircraft carriers now deployed around the world, and the modernization of the Strategic Rocket Forces have put the Soviet Union in a stronger position in terms of long-range arms deployments. But, with defense expenditure now sitting at around 4% of GDP, some are asking whether or not additional allocations are necessary to prevent the Soviet Union’s long-time reach in the Middle East from slipping away. While the Cold War may have ended, the great power rivalry continues in new theaters.}