by Max Barry

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Region: Right to Life

Sorry for the delay, very busy weekend, wrote piecemeal.

Basilicus

Basilicus wrote:U.S. politics:

Basilicus wrote:I don't think populism is on the left-right spectrum, so I disagree that populism only works in some places.

I suppose it depends on how populism is defined, see below.

Basilicus wrote:

The fact that most other developed economies of comparable scale have debts that are as high or higher, I'm not sure how that would shake out. Everyone is borrowing from everyone, and I think ultimately it all cancels out. I'm not interested in that aspect of economics, so I have no data to back that up; but for instance, roughly 25% of the national debt is owed by the government to itself, and the United States holds debt of countries that have their debt. Interest payments will certainly get high, but as that becomes true for most of the developed world, I think there will be room for "creative" solutions.

There actually is a figure for that-NIIP-basically the net for being an international creditor/debtor, and unfortunately it does not balance out, and actually makes things look worse than looking at outright debt burden-the U.S. unfortunately is at the top of that list with no-one else close, $10 trillion in the hole, c. 50% of GDP. The closest developed top 10 economy to them in terms of debt is the UK at about half that, c. 25% of GDP, (-$700 billion) and plenty are actually in the positive-Germany, Japan, China, Canada.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Net_international_investment_position

That said, even if we do discount those unpleasant numbers, at the bare minimum it should be apparent that the nation best able to be responsible and trim its deficits is going to do much better for itself in the long run, a virtuous cycle. The more the U.S. pays in interest on the debt, either the more in slows its economy by having to try to counterbalance that, or the more it adds to the debt to increase those interest payments further. More unpopular but more healthy policy of pushing down deficits will free up more and more money as the debt shrinks in gross or as a percentage, meaning more room for expansionary economic policy and a shrinking burden.

Basilicus wrote:

To the belief of no one. Everyone knows she called it the "gold standard" and they cracked down Stalin-style on anyone who tried to bring it up at the Democratic Convention. And comparing her position to Obama doesn't matter; no one challenged Obama's policy on trade because his stance was mirrored by his opponents. It wasn't relevant.

Generally agreed on Clinton's backpedaling not really helping her that much, though as to the comparison with Obama, that goes to the question of whether it was primarily people going against Hillary or going for Trump. If the theory we're going on is that trade is very unpopular and that didn't hurt Obama because he was also running against free traders, then you would expect to see 2016 be primarily big numbers for Trump rather than small numbers for Hillary-but we primarily saw the second one.

Basilicus wrote:

There's no data point that exists, there's too much evidence throughout history that populism is always the most effective method of garnering public support. I never said that Stewart and Trump weren't "real" populists, I just said that Trump tailored his message to his audience (which is literally the only real requirement of populism, "give the people what they want"); Stewart offered Virginia voters nothing they were asking for. Something that is popular on the national level is not going to be popular everywhere--but that doesn't mean populism doesn't work, it means that you've got to speak the language of the people you're campaigning to. Julius Caesar, the "founding father" of populism and arguably the most successful populist in history, probably wouldn't have to much luck if he had tried to court the Persian people instead of the Romans. That doesn't mean populism only works in Rome, it just means that a Roman message will fall on deaf, Persian ears. "When in Virginia, do as the Virginians do."

That's a vague enough definition of populism as to be almost meaningless, then. Essentially that would just be splitting politicians into two groups, populists who poll-test their positions and idealogues who belief-test them. I'm not inherently against setting the definition on that level, but it seemed like we were working with the definition that set it as more of a political term in the vague trade-skeptic leftish-economically conservativish culturally sense. Under the 'give the people what they want' definition, a populist could very well be a free trader and much-maligned 'corporate' Republican if that's what they were appealing to. If Paul Ryan's district was seen as 'suburban frou-frou', he could be a populist.

I'm certainly willing to debate on that definition of populism, just to be clear, it just seems like we've been moreso using a different one, or we might just both be half talking past each other.

Basilicus wrote:

Romney reaffirmed his intention not to run in January 2015 (after previously weighing a third run), which was interpreted at that time as a boon to Jeb Bush, or possibly Jeb's rivals (which ended up being true). Trump did not renew his contract with NBC for the 'Celebrity Apprentice' the very next month (February), raising speculation he was going to run for president. He then announced he was forming an exploratory committee on March 18th the month after that. So I think the timeline syncs up very well.

Sources:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/romney-out-a-boost-for-jeb-bush-and-who-else/2015/01/30/22a4bfdc-a8a4-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_story.html
https://web.archive.org/web/20150710152015/http://www.unionleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=%2F20150227%2FNEWS0605%2F150229334%2F1010%2FArt
https://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2015/03/nbc-still-planning-for-apprentice-despite-donald-trumps-presidential-claims-204171

That's fair enough-I was not aware of all the details of the show renewal and the like.

Basilicus wrote:

Certainly I don't mean that they were a virtual puppet government under the Brezhnev Doctrine; I just mean that they were a satellite in the sense they were in the USSR's "orbit".

Ah, I was interpreting the term differently, I'd consider that fair enough with that definition.

Basilicus wrote:

Yet. The unipolar system has only been around for 29 years. The multipolar system had 297 years to screw up. Also I would argue that in modern times people are less likely to go to war because quality of life has improved so much. I haven't done any statistical analysis to prove my theory, but I would reason that the effectiveness of superpower technology and improved standard of living has made people around the world more reticent to gamble on a war. I also think the world wars kind of shocked people into being more cautious.

This is probably the best argument, to be quite honest. It's difficult to argue for the multipolar theory off of history just because its history is pretty darn bad, better to note that the unipolar system hasn't had as much time to make its own mistakes. (I've seen some people argue that some other periods were unipolar, like a 19th Century 'Pax Britannica', but that doesn't hold up to scrutiny in my eyes.)

Basilicus wrote:

The unipolar system also doesn't have the same successes. The Boxer Rebellion intervention was in many ways a masterclass in successful multipolar cooperation between the Great Powers. The coalitions led by the US today rely disproportionately on US resources and, I would argue, is unsustainable. If not economically, then politically.

The Boxer Rebellion is a pretty minor victory to have, basically just throwing a random division's worth of troops at the problem, it's hardly something that that system made possible, moreso just an example of that system not breaking apart for once.

Basilicus wrote:

Lastly, as I said, I think a tripolar system works better than generic multipolarism with a greater multitude of powers. During the lead up to both world wars there were several powers in play; during WWI they were all of comparable strength; during WWII they were all of comparable weakness--Hitler's success was less a product of Germany's strength than it was the product of his neighbors' weakness. The strongest period of multipolarism was during the original Concert, when the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Germany (with occasional help from France and Britain) were able to neutralize Napoleon during the Hundred Days and stabilize insurrections in Spain and Naples.

It only fell apart when the 1848 Revolutions destabilized Austria and Napoleon III took over in France, starting off a chain-reaction of destabilizing nationalism until Bismarck defeated Napoleon, unified Germany, and began the second phase of the Concert under the League of the Three Emperors. It was only after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 that the second Concert began to deteriorate, and conflict between Austria and Russia would eventually lead to the first world war. Under Metternich and Bismarck, the nearly 100 years of the Concert were largely successful, with a "brief" 23 year intermission under Napoleon III, who destabilized the system in an attempt to remodel France into Europe's dominant power (which it was, at least until his defeat by Bismarck). That still leaves 76 years of relative calm compared to the chaos of the Cold War and "Pax Americana".

It feels odd to cite that as a tripolar period with the two single largest powers noted only in passing. That was very much a multipolar period, and even that timeline does not present a great case for it. The starting date gets set just after the most destructive European war in generations, so it has a pretty nice starting advantage in that such conflicts by necessity leave breathing room between them, then lasts thirty-three years until continent-wide revolution, then less than a decade before the next European war, then less then a decade until the next, then less than half a decade until the next, and finally manages to hold out for a few decades of relative peace before ending in a World War. Compare that to the stability of Europe in the bipolar and unipolar systems once the second multipolar World War came down and you get a losing proposition.

Basilicus wrote:

True, Hitler is slammed for his decisions on Stalingrad, while some historians argued he actually bought valuable time for the Wehrmacht to regroup on the Eastern Front. So the same could, conceivably, at least on an academic level, be true for Chamberlain. Still, that argument can cut both ways: it can just as easily be said that Chamberlain bought time for Germany to mobilize too, and Germany's rearmament was proceeding much more rapidly than the Western allies.

That last point is a more objective claim, though, and doesn't really work-British and French (and if you want to count Soviet, absolutely Soviet, though I would not) military production broadly exceeded Germany's in 1938 and early 1939 most crucially in aircraft, as became so important in the Battle of Britain, as well as pretty much the entire armored strength of the UK that would come to bear in North Africa. The argument that the extra time helped Germany more would have to try to claim that they benefited more subjectively in organization or something, for materiel it was pro-Allies.

Horatius Cocles wrote:That's not half as grievous as the news about Trump having intelligent reports that Russia was placing bounty on our soldiers heads in Afghanistan. And the man sworn to protect and defend American lives has done nothing.

Not to be a pedant in a charged situation, but nothing in the President's oath says anything about protecting and defending American lives-only the Constitution. The plainest way to protect and defend both would be to pull forces out of Afghanistan unless and until an actual Constitutional declaration of war is made.

Culture of Life wrote:I'm obviously disappointed, but I'm also cautiously optimistic....
The main opinion in Casey had only three votes, so it is not technically "binding precedent." Let's see if Roberts is willing to overturn Roe if the question is squarely presented to him.

He is not. At this point, I think even cautious optimism is likely to get only lead to disappointment. I have no more confidence in Roberts's opinion here being about precedent than I do the Bostock decision being about textualism, in both, it works as a convenient means to avoid a ruling considered controversial by the left. Roberts was not especially concerned with precedent in denying cert two weeks ago, and I expect his use of it to be as fickle as anything he does these days.

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