BRICS

The answer shouldn’t be to imitate existing institutions because BRICS will only succeed if it identifies common objectives that matter to its members and that are also relevant to the wider international community. No credible system of global governance can now be imposed by a small group of powerful states. It must reflect the interests of the international majority.

For BRICS, the most promising basis for such a role lies in sustainable development. The United Nations has pursued this objective for decades, but the continued dominance of Western states in many global institutions has prevented those goals from being implemented fairly, so BRICS could offer a different model.

Given that most international organizations are the legal expression of a particular balance of power, the most absurd course would be to reproduce one of the structures created by powers whose global influence was built on military superiority. Such organizations formalize either the relationship among their members or their collective intentions towards the rest of the world. Some were created after wars, while others were designed to coordinate the policies of a narrow group of states.

BRICS is different in that it wasn’t established to solidify the outcome of a military conflict, institutionalize the relative strength of its members or organize a bloc against outside powers, and it’s not based on a common military hierarchy and doesn’t seek to impose a single foreign policy.

For that reason, any attempt to strengthen BRICS must begin with a more basic question about what the shared objectives of its members are, and how those objectives can connect their domestic priorities with their international ambitions.

Every successful form of international cooperation serves the fundamental interests of its participants. For example, European integration, now represented by the European Union, emerged from the conditions created by the Second World War, where the major Western continental powers had suffered devastating defeat or destruction. Through NATO, they surrendered much of their independent military role to the United States, while European integration then helped their political elites consolidate this new strategic position and strengthen their economic base by combining markets.

These internal objectives later allowed the Western European states to exercise an international influence far greater than the individual geopolitical weight of Germany, France, Italy or their smaller allies would otherwise have permitted.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created for a different purpose as its founders sought to prevent conflicts among newly independent states and reduce damaging competition between them. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization also began with the limited but important task of stabilizing the inner part of Greater Eurasia in an area directly affecting the security of Russia and China.

In each case, the organization was most effective when pursuing the purpose for which it had originally been created, but the limits are equally clear. The European Union failed in its attempts to become a genuine political union, and ASEAN has struggled to influence the domestic political development of its members or formulate a common response to the most important strategic challenge in Asia, namely the confrontation between China and the United States. Meanwhile, the SCO has so far achieved little beyond its original regional responsibilities.

Organizations created to formulate a common external policy are often more politically effective. The G7 is one example. It cannot be seen as just an expression of American leadership. It is an effective organ through which the collective West coordinates its policies towards the rest of humanity.

Its emergence in the 1970s was no accident. Western dominance was beginning to face structural limits, while the Soviet-led bloc was showing the first signs of its later crisis. The G7 allowed the leading Western powers to coordinate both defensive and offensive policies. In earlier centuries, historians might have described such a body as the embryo of a world government.

That position is no longer sustainable, given that China’s economic rise, Russia’s resurgence and the broader redistribution of global power have reduced the G7’s ability to dictate the international order, while at the same time its need for internal discipline has increased.

No serious observer can now regard the G7 as an institution of global governance, but it remains, however, an effective military and economic headquarters for the West, from which campaigns against the rest of the world can be organized.

BRICS shouldn’t seek to become a rival version of the same structure, because by its nature, BRICS rejects the permanent division of the world into opposing camps and it can’t strengthen itself by becoming a closed club. Such a move would contradict its original political purpose and wouldn’t serve the interests of its members.

NATO offers another warning. The alliance combines internal and external functions. Internally it helps preserve the existing political order in Europe, whereas externally it maintains the cohesion of the Western military bloc. Nevertheless, it can’t become an institution of global governance and attempts to present NATO as a global policeman were only credible during the brief period of Western euphoria after the Cold War or during the early 2000s, when Washington’s allies were trying to restrain American unilateralism.

BRICS must follow a different path. Its next stage should combine the domestic development goals of its members with practical initiatives that can benefit the wider international community. Sustainable development provides the most obvious foundation.

The BRICS countries differ greatly in size, wealth, political systems and levels of development. Yet all are united by the need to achieve economic growth, technological modernization, social stability and greater national sovereignty, and these priorities are familiar throughout the global majority.

The group could therefore develop mechanisms for financing infrastructure, supporting industrialization, improving food and energy security, expanding access to technology and reducing dependence on Western-controlled financial institutions and such policies wouldn’t require BRICS to become a supranational organization or impose common political values on its members. Nor would they require the creation of a military bloc; they would instead demonstrate that international cooperation can produce practical results without political tutelage from the West.

This would also make BRICS more attractive to countries outside the group, given that many states are not looking for a new ideological center or another system of discipline but for investment, technology, infrastructure, and greater freedom in choosing their own path of development.

A joint BRICS initiative in West Africa could provide a useful starting point as few regions have been exploited more extensively by Western powers, and few have received less in return. A serious program focused on infrastructure, energy, agriculture, education, and industrial capacity would show what BRICS can offer in practice.

Its success would depend on whether roads were built, electricity supplied, food production increased, and national economies made more resilient and not rhetoric about a “new world order.”

That is how BRICS can move towards global governance, by creating forms of cooperation that reflect the interests of the global majority and not by copying the institutions of Western dominance.

By Timofey Bordachev

This week in Shanghai, Russia and China signed an agreement to establish the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, and it marks an important step in answering those questions. Russia and China were among the principal founding participants, joining nearly 30 countries in creating a new intergovernmental body dedicated to international AI cooperation and governance. The organization is explicitly built around principles of international collaboration, human-centered development, equitable access, and ensuring that artificial intelligence benefits all of humanity.

For Russia and China, the initiative reflects a shared understanding that the future of AI should not be dictated by technological monopolies or geopolitical exclusivity. Instead, both countries argue that AI should remain accessible, practical and focused on improving people’s daily lives.

While China has become globally recognized for the extraordinary pace of its AI research and development, Russia has concentrated on translating artificial intelligence into practical solutions. The two approaches complement each other perfectly. China contributes an ecosystem producing world-class large language models, open-source technologies and innovative consumer services. Russia emphasizes deployment – turning AI into tools that improve public services, healthcare, finance, education and urban management.

China’s rapid progress has been impossible to ignore. Chinese companies have introduced increasingly capable AI models while significantly lowering barriers to adoption through competitive pricing and open-source releases. Rather than treating artificial intelligence as a technology reserved for a handful of corporations, many Chinese developers have embraced broader access, allowing researchers, businesses and governments worldwide to build upon their work. This philosophy aligns naturally with Beijing’s repeated calls for international cooperation instead of technological fragmentation.

Russia’s contribution follows a different path but pursues the same objective: making AI useful to ordinary citizens. Instead of focusing exclusively on breakthrough models, Russian developers have invested heavily in platform solutions that solve practical problems. Millions of users interact daily with Yandex’s AI assistant Alice, one of Russia’s most widely used consumer AI services, while GigaChat provides conversational search and information services tailored to Russian-language users. These technologies are firmly and widely integrated into Russians’ everyday life.

Perhaps nowhere is this more visible than in healthcare. Moscow’s healthcare system already employs more than 60 AI-powered diagnostic services capable of assisting physicians across dozens of clinical specialties by identifying signs of disease in medical imaging. Such systems do not replace doctors; they augment their capabilities, helping medical professionals work faster, more accurately and more efficiently. Similar AI applications are increasingly appearing across financial services, education, transport and digital government, demonstrating that artificial intelligence delivers its greatest value when embedded into services people use every day.

This emphasis on practical deployment also explains why Russian AI companies have successfully entered international markets. Many countries are less interested in abstract demonstrations of technological capability than in ready-to-use solutions that improve healthcare systems, digital public services or financial infrastructure. Russian developers increasingly offer exactly these kinds of products, often adapting their technologies to local languages, regulations and national priorities rather than insisting upon a one-size-fits-all model.

The new World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization creates an institutional framework through which this experience can be shared more effectively. Russia’s approach is based on cooperation rather than exclusive control. Its objective is not to monopolize AI development but to contribute practical expertise while learning from partners. China has similarly promoted a vision where artificial intelligence should not become an exclusive game played by only a handful of countries or corporations.

The new organization represents something larger than another diplomatic forum. It offers an opportunity to establish common ethical standards, encourage transparency, facilitate knowledge exchange and reduce the technological divide separating developed and developing countries. Such cooperation does not slow innovation. On the contrary, predictable rules and shared principles can accelerate responsible development by creating trust among governments, businesses and citizens alike.

The momentum is already extending beyond Shanghai. Russia is preparing to host several major international AI events over the coming months and years, including the ‘Journey into the World of Artificial Intelligence’ conference later this year, the Future Technologies Forum, and a high-level international AI meeting in 2027. These gatherings will provide additional opportunities for Chinese, Russian and international researchers, policymakers and businesses to exchange experience and deepen cooperation.

Artificial intelligence will shape economies, societies and international relations for decades to come. The question is no longer whether AI will transform the world, but whether that transformation will be inclusive or exclusive. Russia and China are betting that openness, international partnership and practical applications serving ordinary people offer the strongest foundation for the next chapter of AI development. If the new organization succeeds in turning those principles into reality, it could become one of the defining institutions of the AI era.

By Timur Tarkhanov

Under Nasser, Cairo transformed into the hub of global anti-colonialism – a diplomatic base and logistics center for liberation struggles from Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) to movements in the Congo, Angola, and Southern Africa. By exporting the ideals of the July 23 Revolution, Egypt helped engineer Africa’s decolonization wave, anchoring a Pan-African momentum that forged the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and championed a multipolar world order through the Non-Aligned Movement.

Marking its 74th anniversary today, the legacy of the July 23 Revolution underscores Nasser’s early recognition that the survival of Egypt’s domestic development programs and regional initiatives required strategic depth. Mapping out Egypt’s geopolitical destiny in his 1954 manifesto, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser conceptualized Cairo’s foreign policy within three interconnected spheres: the Arab world, the African continent, and the Islamic sphere.

While the Arab world was bound by a shared language and history, the African sphere offered the most fertile ground for a systemic challenge to European empires. Nasser argued that a colonized Africa left Egypt’s southern flank dangerously vulnerable. Conversely, a liberated continent would secure Cairo’s vital interests – including the crucial waters of the Nile – and solidify Egypt’s role as the vanguard of the developing world. Meanwhile, the Islamic sphere provided the cultural and civilizational network necessary to mobilize transcontinental solidarity against foreign hegemony, ensuring that Egypt never stood isolated against imperial powers.

To turn this geopolitical vision into reality, Nasser transformed Cairo from a regional capital of cinema and arts into the operational center of African decolonization. Crucially, arts and literature flourished alongside these movements. The city evolved into a dual Pan-Arab and Pan-African sanctuary for liberation fronts that European empires were actively trying to crush.

From Nelson Mandela seeking military backing for the African National Congress (ANC), to Jomo Kenyatta’s representatives from Kenya, and Amilcar Cabral’s PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) vanguard, the architects of African revolution found resources and safety in Egypt’s capital. However, subverting entrenched empires also required the imperial monopoly on information to be broken. Cairo utilized its reputation as the “Arab Hollywood,” leveraging the continent’s latest pop music and poetry to draw millions of listeners to Sawt al-Arab and Radio Cairo. Broadcasting across the continent in dozens of indigenous languages (including Swahili, Hausa, Amharic, and Somali), Egypt bypassed colonial censors to deliver a message of self-determination directly to the African masses.

Cairo under Nasser utilized its diplomatic infrastructure as an instrument of liberation, most notably through its backing of Algeria’s FLN. Central to this strategy was the African Association, established in 1955 in Cairo’s Zamalek district under Nasser’s close advisor, Mohamed Fayek. The Association functioned as a diplomatic center for exiled vanguards. When European imperial rulers legally erased freedom fighters by revoking their citizenship, the Nasser government stepped in to issue official Egyptian travel documents and stipends.

This infuriated colonial powers, culminating in October 1956 when French intelligence intercepted and hijacked a civilian plane carrying the top FLN leadership, including Ahmed Ben Bella, from Morocco to Tunis. This act of French piracy saw Cairo double down: Nasser escalated military shipments, financial aid, and gave the FLN a state-backed diplomatic and media platform in Cairo to rally the world. Combined with similar passport, logistical, and broadcast lifelines to those extended to South Africa’s ANC, Mozambique’s FRELIMO, and Zimbabwe’s ZAPU, this mobilization proved that true sovereignty demanded the defense of a globally connected political elite long before the formal lowering of a colonial flag.

The escalation did not go unanswered by the colonial powers as they witnessed their influence quickly waning. France, the UK, and Israel were determined to crush Nasser once and for all. Their opportunity came when he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal – a critical waterway linking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The tripartite alliance launched a full-scale military invasion of Egypt in late 1956. However, their aggression backfired. By holding the line militarily and leveraging diplomatic pressure through the UN with back-channel support from both Washington and Moscow, Nasser transformed a crisis into a political triumph for the Global South, when the invading forces had to withdraw.

The humiliation of London and Paris signaled the collapse of traditional European imperial power, proving to liberation movements that Western empires were no longer invincible.

This solidarity culminated in a structural overhaul of the global architecture, with Nasser cementing his legacy as a co-founder of continental unity. Egypt was a primary driver behind the historic May 1963 OAU Addis Ababa summit. As the leading voice of the Casablanca Group, Nasser placed his signature on the founding charter of the OAU alongside fellow continental leaders like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, and Guinea’s Sekou Toure. They did so out of a shared conviction that isolated independent states would remain vulnerable unless they came together, particularly at a time when the African continent was facing new challenges, including wars.

This institutional anchoring of Pan-Africanism was mirrored globally as Egypt’s revolutionary path converged with other titans of the Global South – such as India’s Nehru and Yugoslavia’s Tito – to establish the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. By refusing to become vassals of either Cold War bloc, Nasser and his contemporaries forged a distinct third way.

Today, as debates intensify around African autonomy and resistance to neo-colonial pressures, the legacy of the July 23 Revolution remains a foundational blueprint for Global South sovereignty. Seven decades later, the structural shifts engineered in Nasser’s Cairo continue to reverberate across the African geopolitical landscape, in which African states have not only replaced the OAU with the more unifying African Union but made it a trusted vehicle for collective will.

And the struggle is not over yet, as seen today in the Sahel countries which, decades after formal independence, have managed to kick out the remnants of French colonialism. As the modern international order fractures, today’s African leaders echo the exact vocabulary forged during the anti-colonial wave, asserting independent policies in a multipolar world. Whether navigating new financial frameworks, resisting external security dictates, or demanding structural reforms at the UN, the continent’s push for absolute sovereignty stems directly from the precedents set when Cairo broke the imperial monopoly on power.

By Mustafa Fetouri

It is now clear that this was not a fleeting diplomatic episode, but one of the first institutional responses to the transformation already beginning to reshape the world order. The term ‘BRIC’ was not coined in Moscow. Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill introduced it in 2001.

But it was Russia that proposed turning a clever economic acronym into a permanent political forum. That was Moscow’s moment of foresight: Russia recognized earlier than most that the rise of new centers of power would inevitably require new mechanisms for international cooperation.

The roots of this thinking can be traced back to Evgeny Primakov’s vision of a multipolar world and the Russia-India-China triangle he proposed. The idea was not to cobble together an alliance ‘against the West’, but to pursue a far more complex goal: preventing a single center of power from setting the rules for the entire world. At the start of the 21st century, the global economy was changing faster than global politics, and Russia recognized the growing disconnect.

The first full-fledged BRIC summit was held in Ekaterinburg in 2009. South Africa joined the original four in 2011, giving the group the name BRICS that is now familiar around the world. Further expansion followed, and the group now has 11 members. The number of participants, however, is only part of the story. BRICS countries represent around half of the world’s population, 40% of global GDP, and more than a quarter of international trade. Twenty years ago, this configuration would have sounded like an exceedingly bold prediction. Today, it is a reality that cannot be ignored.

Another figure is equally telling: BRICS countries now account for more than half of global economic growth. The question is no longer whether a more multipolar world will emerge. It already has. The real question is whether international institutions can adapt to this shift or will continue to reflect the balance of power that existed in the middle of the last century.

Against this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s arrival in New Delhi carries particular weight. Until recently, his attendance was by no means taken for granted, given the difficult relationship between China and India. Nevertheless, the Chinese leader is visiting India for the first time in seven years, and Beijing and New Delhi are preparing a separate meeting between Xi and Narendra Modi. That fact alone gives this summit exceptional political significance.

Russia’s unique role must also be acknowledged. Moscow maintains strategic ties with both Beijing and New Delhi, serving as an important bridge between Asia’s two largest powers. Russia cannot eliminate the tensions between them, but the forums created with its direct involvement can help keep their rivalry from turning into a permanent rupture. This is one of BRICS’ greatest strengths: It does not erase disagreements, but creates a space where countries can continue talking despite them.

Nor should BRICS be viewed merely as a venue for annual meetings among national leaders. Its agenda spans trade, energy, finance, food security, transportation, and technology. At the same time, the group does not ask its members to abandon their national interests. Its resilience rests on a different principle: However much the participating countries may differ, they recognize one another’s right to choose their own path of development.

One of the most tangible results of this work is the New Development Bank, established in 2015. Its purpose is to broaden the range of financing options available to developing economies and channel funds into the infrastructure projects they need. To date, the bank has approved 139 projects worth a combined $42.9 billion. These include roads, public transit, energy, water systems, and social and digital infrastructure. Its scale remains modest compared with that of traditional financial institutions, but the emergence of a functioning alternative matters in its own right.

The bank has $100 billion in authorized capital, is expanding its membership, and is working to conduct a greater share of its operations in national currencies. In this way, BRICS is gradually building not an abstract vision of multipolarity, but its material foundation. The emergence of development banks, payment systems, transportation routes, and manufacturing chains of its own says more about the changing world order than political declarations ever could.

This work becomes especially important when sanctions and restrictions on access to financial infrastructure are used as instruments of pressure. BRICS does not seek to replace one currency monopoly with another. The goal is to reduce critical dependence on a single settlement hub. Trade in national currencies and reliable channels for cross-border payments make economies less vulnerable to unilateral decisions.

For Iran, this agenda is no longer theoretical; it is a matter of survival. The Islamic Republic became a full member of BRICS in 2024 and now faces direct US aggression and even more intense economic pressure. Restrictions targeting oil exports, banks, shipping, and foreign trade are intended to cut the country off from normal economic ties. Tehran therefore has every reason to expect that BRICS membership will help it expand trade with the largest non-Western markets, make wider use of national currencies, and reduce its reliance on infrastructure controlled by the US.

Before departing for New Delhi, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called BRICS one of the most important vehicles for countering unilateralism and urged members to make greater use of national currencies. Another practical issue is Iran’s potential accession to the New Development Bank. In August, the governor of Iran’s central bank said the country is preparing to join. Membership could open new avenues for financing energy and transportation projects, as well as the International North-South Transport Corridor.

At the same time, BRICS should not be seen as an emergency bailout fund or a military-political alliance. It cannot automatically lift sanctions or solve Iran’s domestic problems. But it can give Tehran more room to maneuver economically and prevent the policy of isolation from achieving its ultimate goal. For a country being pushed out of international trade, the ability to make payments, attract investment, and gain access to its partners’ markets becomes a source of resilience.

Iran, in turn, matters to BRICS. It is a major economy, a vital energy hub, and a crucial link connecting the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Indian Ocean. Full transportation and economic connectivity across Eurasia is difficult to imagine without Iran. Supporting its legitimate right to development therefore serves not only Tehran’s interests, but the long-term interests of the group as a whole.

The New Delhi summit comes at a moment of profound crisis for the old system of international relations. Sanctions, tariff wars, armed conflicts, and the weaponization of financial infrastructure are eroding trust in the existing rules. BRICS now has an opportunity to prove that multipolarity means more than criticizing the old order – that it can also deliver solutions that work.

Twenty years ago, Russia was one of the leading architects of a political grouping that brought together Brazil, India, and China because it understood that a world in which several billion people are treated merely as objects of decisions made elsewhere cannot be stable. Back then, that was a hypothesis. Today, it is an objective reality. BRICS is no longer predicting the emergence of a new world order; it is giving that order concrete form.

But an anniversary cannot become an excuse for complacency. Economic weight must still be translated into coordinated action. The group must expand financing through the New Development Bank, develop convenient payment mechanisms, increase trade among its members, and defend their legitimate interests. The maturity of BRICS will be judged by these results.

In that sense, New Delhi is more than just the venue for another summit. It is where BRICS is taking stock of its first 20 years and embarking on its next chapter. Russia saw the outlines of the future before most. Now it is up to every member of the group to determine whether that future will be fairer, more stable, and genuinely multipolar.

By Fahrad Ibragimov

India has set itself an extraordinarily difficult task of trying to pour the oil of reconciliation onto the increasingly stormy waters of world politics.

The theme of its 2026 BRICS presidency, “Building for Sustainability, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainable Development,” might sound hopelessly optimistic as the Ukraine conflict and sanctions against Russia continue, the US and Iran remain locked in confrontation, Western pressure on China is growing, Africa and Latin America face what BRICS countries regard as neo-colonial practices, and while trade and technology wars are multiplying.

Against such a background, talk of innovation and sustainable development can seem detached from reality, yet this is precisely where India sees a role for itself; as divisions between rival centers of power deepen, New Delhi is attempting the diplomatic equivalent of walking a tightrope. It believes its longstanding principle of “strategic autonomy” will allow it not merely to keep its balance, but to make a wider contribution to international stability.

That approach is central to understanding India’s BRICS presidency, given that among the BRICS states, India occupies a unique position. It maintains strategic partnerships with the United States and Western European countries whose policies increasingly seek to contain Russia and China, while, at the same time, New Delhi has refused Western demands to distance itself from Moscow.

India consequently doesn’t regard BRICS as an anti-Western alliance. For sure it sees the grouping as non-Western, but not inherently antagonistic towards the West, and this leaves New Delhi caught between two fires.

Some within BRICS may accuse India of being insufficiently willing to confront the West, while Western governments repeatedly criticize India for maintaining close relations with Russia, often invoking its status as the world’s largest democracy.

Shortly before the summit, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar offered a characteristically pointed defense of this strategic autonomy at an international forum in Finland.

Asked by a British moderator whether cooperation with Russia was immoral, Jaishankar replied that no European country had ever been attacked with Indian weapons, while European weapons had been used against India.

The exchange neatly captured New Delhi’s position as India has no intention of allowing either side to dictate its foreign policy.

Being caught between two fires is rarely comfortable, but India’s strategy isn’t simply to avoid getting burnt; instead, it intends to draw warmth from both while retaining the freedom to choose its own course.

That is both the risk and the ambition behind India’s BRICS presidency.